



assurance that the other States are complying with it, they complete the confidence-building process. They constitute an element in a mutually complementary set of CSBMs which corroborate each other.

Under such a regime of CSBMs the exchange of information on military forces in the zone would establish a basis of judgement of military potentials. It would be complemented by annual forecasts of how these potentials would be deployed out-of-garrison in the future. This information would be further complemented by the details furnished under the notification measure about the more immediate deployment of these military potentials. Observation would provide the routine basis for assuring the non-threatening character of this activity. But there could be cases where the observers questioned the conformity of the information notified with the activity they witnessed. There might also be cases where military activity occurred which should have been notified, but was not. Inspections would permit the participating States to clarify the nature of such activity.

The question has been asked: how can you verify verification? In a mutually complementary set of CSBMs, each measure reinforces the other and partly serves to verify the other. The confidence-building effect of each measure lies both in its immediate function and in its place in forming an aggregate of

verification. Measure 5 further assures a self-verifying mechanism. Initial monitoring through National Technical Means, including the monitoring of mass media, would indicate whether a notifiable activity was taking place. If this led to suspicions about lack of compliance with the CSBMs, an inspection could verify whether these concerns were justified. Further monitoring might to a degree corroborate the findings of the inspection. On the basis of what I have called an aggregate of verification, clarifications could, if necessary, be sought through communications among the participating States.

In summary, the principle of verification has been recognized by the participating States. The principle of on-site inspections has also been widely recognized. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, the 'Palme Commission', which includes among the commissioners Giorgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow, stated: '...on-site inspections should not be ruled out in principle.' The Madrid mandate provides guidelines for defining what the principle of verification means in practical terms and how to apply it. Measure 5 of our proposal SC.1/Amplified is an *adequate* form of verification which would *correspond* to the content of a set of mutually complementary CSBMs, and as a confidence- and security-building measure itself would form an *integral* part of the agreement."

Statement of July 5, 1985, on Confidence-Building and Its Political Significance

"Eighteen months ago" this Conference began its work in a spirit of hope and urgency. We had gone through a difficult period, a period of harsh words and of tension: a period of threatening political and military horizons. Against an ominous background our Foreign Ministers launched, in this hall, a badly needed process of mutual dialogue on questions of security.

We started out with high hopes.


But I am afraid that the political promise of this Conference may be fading. It is adding little to the East-West dialogue. If the experience of the work of a year and a half is any indicator, we may be well on the way towards a non-achievement; we may have doomed ourselves to add little to East-West cooperation. Bargains, of course, come at the end; but we have yet to begin any preliminary trading of a significant sort.

On the one side of the negotiating table is a detailed and comprehensive programme for cooperation in military affairs. The response of many of our partners has been mostly tactical.

As long as this imbalance persists, it is difficult to see how we should go about generating a negotiating dynamic — and certainly the distinction between 'formal' and 'informal', or one type of meeting or another, will not matter very much.

Let us recall that we are here to contribute to a process. It is a political process aimed at building mutual confidence. Without that confidence, measures of arms control and disarmament will not take root — assuming, even, that they might be negotiated. The confidence we seek needs cooperation.

Our ultimate objective is to stimulate the process we began in Helsinki. But so far, we seem to have been talking



Notifiable military exercises would be subject to observation under a Conference agreement.

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