

complete theory of human emotions, connecting itself naturally and easily with the theory of the intellectual powers, to which I have given in my adhesion, and of which, on a previous occasion, I sketched the evidence. The subject would admit both of detailed analyses of the various emotions which have been treated as simple independent mental states, and of copious illustrations of the effects of the views I have proposed; but if thus treated it would require a volume. On an occasion like the present it may suffice to indicate the effect or tendency of the views proposed, so as fairly to submit them to the judgment of inquirers. It will be seen that I rely first on the principle that all sound philosophy of the human mind has its foundation in a proper attention to the connection of the mind with the physical frame. This is a subject necessarily involving much mystery; yet it is well ascertained that all mental changes belong to the nervous system, and are dependent upon nervous action. The fact that states simultaneously existing, whether as sensations or as ideas and whether simple or complex, acquire the power of reviving each other when one of them is brought up again, is certainly established by experience. The explanation that this fact depends on what we call sympathy in the nervous matter being a property of its nature is, perhaps it is not too much to say, the only conceivable one; and assuming this property, the power of vivid mental states like pleasures and pains to extend their influence beyond the nerves in which they were excited to the whole frame is a natural consequence, whilst this diffusion of pleasure and pain exactly corresponds with the best notion we can form of emotion as distinguished from sensation or intellectual state. But I beg it may be observed to what extent this explanation, if worth anything, must go. It relates not to any single emotion of our nature, but to the whole, in all their variety. It equally explains what are termed affections—that is, permanent tendencies under certain circumstances to the prevalence and influence of certain emotions moderately excited—and of the strongest passions. It traces them all to the influence, direct or indirect, of pleasure and pain, thus shewing the great moving principle of the active part of our nature, and putting us in the proper track for discovering how it can be best regulated. It is commonly believed that moral sentiments constitute a distinct class, arising instinctively and independently, but the theory I have proposed applies to them equally with the other emotions, and their analysis is as easy as that of most others. I might hence attempt to