

and carrying household suffrage against his moderate measure of Reform, the political hacks as one man wanted to depose a leader who had shown himself inferior in cunning; but to their surprise it was found that the people sympathized with integrity though defeated, against successful dishonesty, and Mr. Gladstone was borne back to power with a majority of a hundred, the men who had been conspicuous in attempting to depose him being compelled as the one condition of their own election to swear allegiance to his name.

It is not very likely that Mr. Gladstone will be again a candidate for power; the plutocratic reaction will probably last his time. But even were it otherwise, he could not do a better thing for himself or his party than break finally with the Ultramontanes and all that they command. The alliance never did the Liberals anything but harm. It tainted them before the nation, and when the hour of trial came it failed them. Priests, while the people continue to believe in them, will have their own sphere of action, and be entitled to respect so long as they confine themselves to it. But in politics their name is perfidy. The sole object which they have in view is the aggrandizement of their order; whoever serves that object will for the moment have their support, whoever declines to serve it, and to sacrifice the interests of society to it, will be betrayed by them, whatever benefits they may have received at his hands, however loud their professions of amity may have been. In them the worship of corporate ambition, which they identify with the glory of God, swallows up all faith, all gratitude. This, every political party which tampers with them will in the end learn to its cost. But for Liberals especially nothing can be more suicidal than association with a power which justly regards freedom of thought, the essence of all Liberalism, as its deadliest enemy, and has waged against it, through all ages, an internecine war. The cast of Mr. Gladstone's mind

and the tenor of his previous history are enough to convince us that his motives on the present occasion are ecclesiastical, not political. Probably the interest of his party in the Church, imperilled at once by the propagandism of Rome, and by an affinity which compromises it in the eyes of the nation, chiefly impelled him to take strong ground. But had he been acting from political considerations, the step he has taken, though tardy, would not have been unwise. His position is morally a strong one. He can say with truth to the Roman Catholics, "The nation under my advice has given you a full measure of justice; if you are now going to make war on our nationality, I owe a duty to the country." Archbishop Manning is roused to arms. But the "Apostle of the Genteel" has a harder task before him than that of converting female members of the aristocracy to a religion of confessors and incense, or figuring in full pontificals at the marriage of the Marquis of Bute. He will not find it easy to prove that when a Roman Catholic nobleman professes himself "An Englishman if you will, but above all things a Catholic," he means that his allegiance to the Pope will never be allowed to interfere with his allegiance to the Queen. He will not find it easy to prove that when Father Braun proclaims that in all cases of disputed jurisdiction the Church is to decide and the State is to submit, much independent power is really left to the State. He will not find it easy to prove that the priests in South Germany, when they invited French invasion for the purpose of overthrowing Protestantism, showed a strong sense of their duty to their country. He will not find it easy to prove that Rome has not, ever since she commenced her career of ambition, cherished, and whenever she dared proclaimed doctrines utterly subversive of civil allegiance and of national independence. What he will find it easy to prove is that she ventures to press those doctrines only on the weak and timid; and, when confronted by the strong and re-