

lations to the earth must be the primary fact in the history of any race, and will be found to explain much of its political activity and growth. The material conditions can never be lost sight of by a nation or its historian. In an advanced and complex civilization these material considerations may seem to have given place to "ideas" as determining the acts of a people, but they are always at work silently; and, when they are urgent, ideas, whether moral, political, or religious, will be swept away before them. The *prima vitæ* will govern. Geography, then, in its large sense is indispensable to the understanding of history.

(6) At the back of the sequence of events which we call annals have been thoughts, *i.e.*, ideas and purposes. These, again, have for the most part been closely connected with thinkers and with makers or transformers of politics; although it is true that tendencies often exist and will move a whole people which cannot be traced to any one personality. Thus the series of events as determined by external conditions, but above all by *thoughts* and ideals of life, constitutes history as a science.

If we reflect for a moment we shall see that the writer of the history of a nation in this large, only true sense, much more the historian of the world, ought to be possessed of an intense sympathy with humanity, the imagination of a poet, the thoughtfulness of a philosopher, the knowledge of an encyclopædist and the gifts of an orator. For the historian has to deal with the largest generalization of generalization in every field of human activity, and by dwelling on these to lay bare the secret springs of events and motives and all the causal relations of the growth or decay of nations. Hence we may say that a historical grasp of the life of man through the ages is the last result of a man's culture. If this be

history, it is sufficiently evident that even if you have had a boy under tuition up to the end of the secondary school period, it would be little that he could know of it. But the instruction which the boy receives may always be such as will prepare him for the ultimate comprehension of history in its widest significance. As in all school subjects, we can do nothing in the school period but lay foundations; but, as I have often said elsewhere, we have not only *so* to teach as to give a sound foundation for ultimate knowledge in every department that we admit to the curriculum, but much more have we *so* to teach as to feel that we have already attained an educational purpose, at whatever stage the pupil may cease his attendance at school. What is that purpose generally?

We may sometimes be disposed to think that language is somewhat strained when it is said that the object we have in view, even in the formal discipline of intellect, is ethical. We see that it is so, however, as soon as we understand the meaning of the word "ethical" as marking the issue in personal life and conduct of the Rational and Emotional "which so curiously and subtly blend to make a man." To say that the end is ethical is practically to say that the end of man is the Humanity in him—not this or that specific knowledge or faculty. But however the word may demand explanation or justify restriction as denoting the end of disciplinary studies, its application to the teaching of school history "leaps to the eyes," as the French say.

Generally we would say that we attain our ethical purpose in teaching history by connecting the life of the boy with the life of the past humanity of which he is the most recent outcome. Thus we make it possible for him to become a "being of large discourse looking before and after;"