

confused. It is impossible to get clear meanings from it. It reminds me of the story of the blind men who went to look at an elephant. One felt a leg and said "It is like a tree trunk." The other felt an ear and said "It is like a leaf". The third felt the tail and thought it was a vine. On this evidence the blind men concluded that the elephant was a tree. Consider the white paper of 1964. One can get any meaning from it one wishes. Nothing is clear. It is far from being a blueprint.

There are two essential truths about our national defence. They relate to our physical position and to the size of our country. The first is that the defence of our territory will always depend on others, primarily upon the United States. The second is that the defence of our principles must also depend on others. This will depend to a greater extent though on our political alliances with the Commonwealth, NATO and the United Nations. Of these three organizations only NATO has effective military strength.

To follow this through, our military role will always be to contribute to our own defence to the best of our ability, subject to the reality of our ultimate reliance on others. The degree of political integrity which we would be likely to retain after another world war would depend on the effectiveness of our contribution to our own defence relative to that of other countries. When, therefore, we are discussing integration and unification we must always do so with the knowledge of our dependence on others, realizing that our forces would be only part of a larger defence system.

It is hard to find any real objection to the principle of integration and unification of the supply services, the communications services and training facilities. Indeed, it might be fair to complain that the integration of these services might have gone ahead a great deal faster since the end of the second world war. If the services I have mentioned, along with similar services, were properly integrated, the result ought to be a real saving in both manpower and money. However, I am not sure that this phase of integration has in fact been carried out properly. My impression is that there has been far too little planning. There was and is still far too much haste—why, we do not know. This haste, together with the absence of planning, has, I feel, destroyed some of the advantages of integration at the level I have mentioned to the detriment of

*National Defence Act Amendment*

the morale of our military forces, their military efficiency and, incidentally, the combat efficiency of our troops.

● (6:10 p.m.)

I think this phase of the integration of the services is of such importance that no further steps should be taken until this has been accomplished in reality, not just on paper or in theory. We should have the reality of integration before we go further. Unified command was provided for in large measure by the amendments in 1964 when a single chief of staff was appointed. Unified command has been the subject of long controversy. Nearly every biography and history of world war II cites examples of disastrous mistakes in judgment and often attributes them to lack of unity in command. Many of the people who have written these books are experts but I have got the feeling they are being wise after the event in citing lack of unity as the excuse for other shortcomings such as bad judgment, bad advice or mistakes in execution.

I am not sure that all the damnation of lack of unified command is just. One recent book, for example, talks about the now generally accepted wastefulness of much of our bombing of Germany, but I doubt very much that the course we took in that respect would have changed if there had been unified command.

The 1964 amendments provided for a single chief of staff. The pitfalls in that course of action were set out in great detail both by hon. members and by experts inside and outside this house. The chief objection to a single chief of staff was, and still remains, that it cut off too many high ranking military officers from direct contact with the Minister of National Defence. The minister now gets only the consensus which the chief of staff brings to him. This perhaps cuts out bickering but there is a difficulty because the military machine is much more complicated and technical than ever before. The minister is usually a layman in military matters. Therefore I think he needs more advice rather than less advice.

One cannot help but wonder if many of the early retirements among senior officers are related to the fact that they have lacked direct contact with the minister or direct means of expression of their views within the services. I am not talking about their right to go outside the services and speak, but I think some of the retirements have been due to frustration. Officers have had no way in which to express their dissent and still stay within the services.