

unilateral attempts on Canada's part to impose restrictions would be widely misinterpreted and bitterly resented. For these reasons, (and because of the primacy of skill-criteria in Canada's immigrant selection), the present Canadian policy is not to solicit immigration in developing countries, but to offer the usual facilities to those people who apply.

113. A significant part of the "brain drain" at present is induced or stimulated by the tendency of highly trained students from those countries to settle and remain in Canada or more often to use their training and contacts to re-migrate some time after returning to their home countries. This problem is being alleviated by a growing trend toward "third country" training, in which students are assisted to pursue programmes in neighboring countries whenever possible. This trend is to be welcomed from many other points of view: it stimulates the development of local or regional educational facilities; it offers students more relevant programmes and working conditions; and it is likely to be less costly (than bringing students to Canada) and thus enable a larger number of students to benefit.

114. Another way to limit the "student drain" is to ensure that, where the terms of scholarships or fellowships specify that the recipient return to work in his or her home country, this provision be carefully enforced subject to reasonable limitations to take account of individual cases. Students and other skilled expatriates are often very much in demand by corporations and other agencies operating in their home countries. Wherever possible the facilities of CIDA, Manpower and Immigration and other agencies should be made available to assist in locating and recruiting such personnel.

115. Another point worth stressing is that not all skilled or educated emigrants represent a loss to their home countries. In some instances, where educational programmes do not mesh with manpower requirements, there are large pools of unemployed graduates who represent an economic burden and sometimes lead to serious social and political problems. One logical solution is to assist these personnel to find temporary employment (under technical assistance programmes in some cases) in other developing countries where their skills are in short supply. Temporary terms will almost certainly be necessary in order to assure host countries that opportunities will be available for their own trained nationals as they become qualified.

116. Beyond these rather limited suggestions, the Subcommittee considers that the onus of responsibility for limiting the emigration of skilled manpower from developing countries must rest with their governments.

(iv) The Administrative Structure

117. In the course of the Subcommittee's hearings, witnesses have offered numerous criticisms and suggestions, both general and specific, regarding the administrative structure of Canada's official development assistance effort. A great many of these points related to specific instances or circumstances, and, while interesting and relevant, could not be catalogued here. The attempt in this section will be to cover a number of the most important issues in this field.

118. Early in this section of the report, the Subcommittee stressed the need for greater consistency and improved coordination among the various government departments and agencies involved in Canadian policies affecting developing countries. It was implied there and is re-stated here that these changes cannot be brought about by any simple administrative or hierarchical reorganization. Above all what is needed is continuing evidence of a firm political will at the highest level to ascribe a high priority to all aspects of international development assistance. This priority, and a sense of urgent concern, must be transmitted in turn to all the relevant arms of the Canadian Government. Without such a firm political basis, all other attempts to mobilize a more dynamic and concerted official effort can amount to little more than tinkering.

119. Two recommendations which have been aired repeatedly are that CIDA should either be raised to the status of a full ministry, or that it be given more autonomy, perhaps as a crown corporation. The basic rationale underlying both suggestions seems to be that the aid agency needs more stature and/or independence in those circumstances where its jurisdiction overlaps with those of other departments. The Subcommittee has stated earlier that "development assistance viewpoint" must be more forcefully expressed and more fully heeded in the determination of all Canadian policies vis-à-vis the developing countries. With regard to the effect of formal jurisdictional arrangements, the Subcommittee was most impressed by the candid and considered judgments expressed by Mr. Maurice Strong in his testimony. On this topic he stated,

"As to the question of a separate ministry, I have to say that the arrangement I have worked under has worked extremely well. I have been reporting to a senior minister, the Minister of External Affairs. Although they do not call them junior and senior ministers, I think anyone who is realistic realizes that some departments and some ministers have more weight around the Cabinet table than others, and the Minister of External Affairs is always a man of considerable weight in the Cabinet. Having that man, that minister speak for you I think is a great advantage. I do believe we have evolved out of our peculiar Canadian history a pretty workable arrangement."