

SWEDEN

Working Paper

Suggestions for measures to enhance confidence between the
Parties negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons

In all disarmament negotiations a certain degree of trust between the Parties concerned is an important prerequisite for results. This seems to be particularly true with respect to the efforts to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. One of the characteristics of the negotiations to prohibit these weapons is the difficulty to obtain an effective verification system. Any agreement banning chemical weapons must, therefore, to some extent rely on mutual confidence.

Recent developments have caused increased distrust and a generally deteriorated atmosphere, particularly between the military powers possessing the largest quantities of chemical weapons. In order to improve prospects of ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons there is, therefore, an obvious need to take measures intended to enhance mutual confidence between the countries concerned already during the negotiating stage. Such "preconvention measures" would facilitate and shorten the time needed for negotiations.

It should be noted that some countries have already undertaken such measures in connection with the CD negotiations on chemical weapons.

Having in mind what has previously been undertaken and in order to go forward and intensify these efforts the Swedish delegation considers that it would be useful to discuss the matter in the framework of the CW negotiations in the CD. By way of examples the following preconvention measures could be considered.

1. Declaration of possession or non-possession of chemical weapons.
2. Visits to destruction plants and exchange of information regarding methods for destruction of chemical weapons.
3. Co-operation between States regarding protection of civilian and military personnel against chemical warfare.
4. Exchange of information on methods for monitoring scientific and technical development relevant to chemical weapons.

The declarations mentioned under point 1 have been called for virtually since the beginning of the negotiations on biological and chemical weapons in the late sixties.

Such declarations would in principle put all negotiating Parties whether they possess weapons or not on an equal footing with regard to the availability of relevant information about each other and demonstrate the commitment by possessing Parties to serious negotiations. Such declarations have already been made by many negotiating Parties.