

"I recognize, of course, that the forthcoming General Assembly will wish to discuss disarmament and the progress that we have made so far. However, it does seem to me self-evident that all the United Nations can do, given its previous decision, is to say to this conference: 'Continue your efforts to carry out the task which you have been set'. Obviously...Geneva must continue to be the negotiating forum.

"In this connection let me emphasize once more the important role of the eight uncommitted countries. They were chosen from all the parts of the world precisely to be representatives of the United Nations as a whole; here they have a vital and unique role to play in helping to bring about agreement. They have been constructive participants in all aspects of the negotiations and their presence is one of the main assets of this Conference. I hope and I am sure that they will not lose heart but will continue the work they have been doing.

AREAS OF POSSIBLE PROGRESS

"What we must consider is how the Conference can continue to work without interruption and avoid stalemate. I suggest that we concentrate in the next eight weeks on those areas in which progress can be registered so that we may have some concrete achievements to report to the General Assembly. This Conference must not simply mark time....

"At the top of the list of questions where agreement should be within reach is the cessation of nuclear tests. The announcement of the regrettable decision of the Soviet Government to resume tests points up the fact that this is the most pressing issue we have to resolve. The Canadian position has been and is that we are against all nuclear weapons tests.... All this testing is sheer madness - polluting the air human beings must breathe, endangering the lives of generations yet unborn, and possibly leading to the destruction of civilization....

VERIFICATION ISSUE

"The difficulty of finding a satisfactory verification system has been the main obstacle in the way of an effective test-ban agreement. A major contribution to overcoming this obstacle has been the compromise proposal tabled by the eight uncommitted members of this Conference.

"It is, of course, encouraging that the nuclear powers have all indicated their acceptance of this neutral proposal as a basis for further negotiations. But in my view...the nuclear powers have not exploited sufficiently the possibility for progress which the eight-nation memorandum affords and have been engaged in a largely fruitless debate over how it is to be interpreted. The time is overdue to enter upon real negotiation based on this memorandum.

"There are three basic elements in the compromise suggested by the eight powers:

First, a detection system based on existing national networks, with new posts if necessary;

Second, the establishment of an international scientific commission to process the data yielded by these stations; and

Third, the obligation for states parties to the agreement to provide adequate assurances that a suspicious event on their territory is not, in fact, a nuclear explosion.

"As far as we can see, the combination of an improved system of national detection stations, plus an international establishment to collect and analyse the data received from them, provides a satisfactory technical basis for an agreement acceptable to both sides. The crucial question which remains is how to deal with doubtful events that may be detected on the territory of one of the parties to the treaty. The representative of the United States made an important suggestion at the beginning of last week when he proposed that the latest scientific data provided by recent research be thoroughly reviewed in this Committee and that, in the detailed examination of this information, qualified experts from all delegations should participate.

"I believe that a discussion of this sort should be held and held just as soon as possible; it could lay the foundation for an agreement acceptable to all concerned. The conclusion of a treaty to halt tests for all time not only would be of immeasurable importance as a first step in halting the arms race, but would also create the right atmosphere for constructive progress in other areas of disarmament....

COLLATERAL MEASURES

"I am happy that the Conference has now embarked on an active discussion in the Committee of the Whole of measures for the prohibition of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and the prevention of accidental war.

"In approaching the problem of preventing the wider spread of nuclear weapons, we can draw encouragement from the fact that, through their support for the Irish resolution, which, as you all know, was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly last year, all governments represented at this table are already on record as favouring the adoption of effective measures in this field....

RISK OF WAR BY ACCIDENT

"The other item which is under discussion in the Committee of the Whole (namely, measures to prevent the risk of accidental war) also deals with an urgent problem on which we could reasonably plan to report some agreed measures to the coming General Assembly. The risk of accidental war cannot fail to grow more serious as weapons of ever greater power and complexity are developed. The United States has made several specific proposals designed to deal with this problem and the U.S.S.R., when this Conference resumed, submitted suggestions which in many respects are very similar. We welcome the recognition by the U.S.S.R. that it would be desirable to adopt measures in this field. Like other members who have spoken on this subject, I hope that it will be possible to work out agreed arrangements of this type which could take effect as initial measures without awaiting the completion of our negotiations on the whole programme of general disarmament....

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