

building may differ in one or more key ways, obliging us to reconsider what we once thought was essential to its basic functional character. The transformation view is relatively well-suited to this because it places confidence building within a broader institutional framework and separates the development of measures from the processes associated with their development. The development and implementation processes become more important than the measures in this view. This means that we can more easily think about forms of “confidence building” that revolve around non-traditional measures addressing non-traditional security concerns. Just as important, we can begin to think about other types of multilateral policy activity that may share important functional characteristics with more traditional forms of confidence building. One attractive possibility is the case of efforts to expand non-traditional security regimes that already exhibit cooperative characteristics.

Thus, in our efforts to develop more effective, policy-relevant understandings of confidence building, we must be careful to balance two, diverse concerns. On the one hand, we should ensure that these understandings have a sound conceptual foundation that can provide practical policy guidance for policy makers. On the other hand, we should try to remain open-minded about new confidence building possibilities and new interpretations of how particular confidence building processes actually function. This will prove to be both challenging and rewarding.

### **Policy Implications**

A number of policy implications flow from the transformation view of confidence building.

#### **(1) Understand the Opportunities and Limitations of Confidence Building**

Confidence building is potentially more powerful in changing security relationships than many policy makers may appreciate, but sponsors and participants will be more likely to enjoy success when they have a clearer, conceptually-based

understanding of how it works and under what circumstances. Confidence building should be seen as a valuable policy option with specific requirements, objectives, and associated methods capable of achieving those objectives; all of which require clear articulation. This is the most general and important policy implication, subsuming the more specific implications discussed below.

#### **(2) Distinguish Between Confidence Building Process and CBMs**

Policy makers should not mistake the adoption of CBM-like measures for confidence building. The latter clearly is a *process* and should not be equated directly with CBMs and what they do. It is the process dimension of confidence building that helps policy makers to restructure security relationships, rendering them more cooperative in character and less likely to lead to conflict and misperception. As a result, policy makers should concentrate increasingly on identifying when change is possible and on developing cooperative security arrangements when conditions are supportive. They should concentrate less on CBM package design, which will flow naturally from the effort to develop cooperative solutions. Analysts should concentrate more on understanding the role of supporting conditions and on explaining the nature of the confidence building process rather than focussing on CBMs and what they do.

#### **(3) Encourage Policy Relevant Research**

The tendency to misunderstand what confidence building is and how it works is a direct result of the lack of a conceptually-based understanding of confidence building in the professional literature or in the policy community. Thus, another important policy implication is the need for analysts to develop better accounts of this security management approach and for policy makers to draw on these accounts.

These accounts, like the transformation view advocated in this report, need to be sensitive to causal issues and must try to avoid over-concentrating on CBMs as the essence of confidence