

6. We consider the international verification measures to be implemented under the Convention to be of great importance and that these should be carefully spelt out within the provisions of the Convention. These measures should provide for the concept of "verification by challenge". An important place will need to be given to on-site verification and other control methods. Systematic measures for, inter alia, the organization of international investigation and inquiry procedures will need to be included.
7. We agree that systematic international verification measures will need to be concentrated on:
 - (a) the destruction of existing stockpiles of CW agents;
 - (b) the dismantling of existing CW production plants, or ensuring that moth-balled plants are not used, or ensuring that plants are converted to peaceful activities;
 - (c) the non-production of single purpose highly toxic (mainly nerve) agents, including single purpose precursors.
8. We would support an international verification structure that would include a Consultative Committee open to all parties to the Convention. A small permanent secretariat and an international "roster of experts" with specialized laboratory facilities could service the Committee. The experts could be involved in the problems of near-site and on-site inspections. Assistance by this group could be provided as required to national control agencies with advice on manning and equipping their own control organizations.
9. The Convention should not restrict the right of any States who wish to accept regional measures stricter than those laid down in the Convention. While these should not be necessary in a comprehensive and unambiguous Convention they may be seen as a useful confidence building measure in the short term.
- 10.(a) We consider it important that States possessing CW stocks and production facilities declare these stocks and facilities at the earliest possible date. Declaration by States that do not possess CW agents, nor have any intention to acquire them, would also be useful as a confidence building measure.
- 10.(b) and (c) We agree that technical visits for the exchange of information between States Parties would be helpful. We would also agree that co-operation and exchanges of information between States Parties in the field of chemical warfare protection measures would be helpful.