

have to accord the United States and Canada a substantial role in future European affairs. If it failed to do so, it would be a clear indication that the Soviet Union was guided by offensive ambitions. Precisely what a Declaration on security and cooperation in Europe might look like cannot of course be predicted. A number of general indications are however already available. For example, in Kosygin's report on the Ninth Five Year Plan at the Twenty-fourth Congress, the CSCE was depicted as building confidence in Europe and opening the way for extensive economic, scientific, and technological cooperation in the development of transcontinental transportation and hydroelectric nets, the resolution of environmental problems, and in dealing with cancer and cardiovascular disease.<sup>63</sup> Considerably more specific indications of the possible content of an opening Soviet statement at the CSCE are to be found in a recent article in Foreign Affairs written by Evgeny Chussudovsky, a Soviet citizen and senior United Nations official.<sup>63</sup>

Entitled "Genoa Revisited: Russia and Coexistence," Chussudovsky's essay was at once an account of Soviet policy at Genoa, a proposal for a "far-reaching accommodation between the East and the West," and an attempt to implement Lenin's instructions to support the more moderate trends in Western policy toward Soviet Russia. That it was placed in a journal read by the American foreign policy elite and