

40. The 1973 Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

This agreement reaffirmed the two Parties' good intentions to seek a more extensive arms-control accord and noted some general principles that would guide that effort.

41. The 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty
The Protocol reduced the number of ABM sites permitted from two to one. It thus enhanced (in some eyes, at any rate) the mutual vulnerability of the Soviet Union and the United States.

42. The 1974 Vladivostok Accord
This was a joint statement of intent to seek a long-term strategic weapons agreement negotiated on the basis of equal aggregate ceilings (2400 total strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 1320 MIRVed nuclear delivery vehicles). The new agreement would also include the verification measures developed for the Interim Agreement.

Several post-1975 agreements could be added to this list:

1. The 1976 Agreement between France and the USSR on the Prevention of the Accidental or Unauthorized Use of Nuclear Weapons.
2. The 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.
3. The 1977 Agreement between the UK and the USSR on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War.
4. The 1979 Statement by the USSR on the Backfire Bomber.
5. The 1979 Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) (Including "Protocol to the Treaty" and "Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the Treaty").

6. The 1979 Memorandum of Understanding between the USA and the USSR Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms (Including "Statement by the USA of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the SALT II Treaty" and "Statement by the USSR of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the SALT II Treaty").

7. The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.⁶

In addition to these examples, there are a number of other agreements or understandings that some authors suggest are CBMs. For instance, there are arrangements from Latin America which closely resemble some of the European CBM proposals. Argentina and Brazil have participated in periodic joint naval manoeuvres, Brazil and Uruguay hold joint exercises for anti-submarine warfare, and Panama and Venezuela engage in joint exercises involving all three services. Many Latin American states invite military observers from neighbouring states to their exercises. Latin American officers often enroll in neighbouring military academies. In addition, there are frequent exchanges of military missions and the chiefs of staff of many states hold joint annual conferences.⁷ A more contemporary and specific illustration of Latin American Confidence-Building Measures can be found in the "Principles for the Implementation of the Commitments Undertaken in the Document of Objectives", adopted by the Central American and Contadora Group Foreign Ministers in Panama City, January 8, 1984. Amongst the six measures associated with "Security Affairs" are familiar CBMs: to prepare "a registry or detailed inventory of military installations, weapons, and troops by each of the Central American states, in order to establish the foundations for a policy to control and reduce these things, providing ceilings and resulting in a reasonable bal-

⁶ For texts see Jozef Goldblat, *Agreements for Arms Control: A Critical Survey* (London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1982) and Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman (eds.) *A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament* (New York: R. R. Bowker Company, 1973).

⁷ For a general discussion of Confidence Building in the region, see Jack Child (ed.) *Maintenance of Peace and Security in the Caribbean and Central America*, Report Number 18 (New York: International Peace Academy, 1984).

