

Mortmain, and so (saving the effect of the Act of the legislature and what was done under its authority) there is no reason why the dispositions of the Blenheim property made by the testator William Spragge should not take effect.

The question is, whether the terms of the Act, and the sales made by virtue of the authority to sell conferred upon the trustees under the will of Joseph Bitterman Spragge, have had the effect of cutting these dispositions out of William Spragge's will.

In construing an Act of Parliament, and more especially a private Act, care is to be taken to see that, only where the words employed compel it, is a wider meaning to be given to the language than is necessary to give effect to the objects of the legislature. The words are to be construed *prima facie* in their natural and grammatical sense, but with reference to the subject matter and the context. . . .

[Reference to *The Duke of Buccleugh*, 15 P. D. 86, at p. 96.]

In the Act in question here the object and intention are very apparent. The legislature was applied to, not to alter, vary, or destroy any of the trusts of the testator's will, but simply to enable the trustees to sell and put into and hold in the form of money the property which by the Act they were empowered to sell. The sole object apparently was to benefit the tenant for life, Mrs. Lett, who with her husband was the petitioner for the Act, by enhancing her income during her lifetime. This much may fairly be inferred from the preamble and the directions as to the investment of the proceeds of the sales. It is eminently a case for the application of the principle stated by Lord Justice James in the case referred to by the learned Chief Justice, of *In re Barber*, 17 Ch. D. 241, viz., that the presumption is, if the words of the Act really admit of that interpretation, that the legislature did not intend to interfere with any legal rights or any legitimate expectations whatsoever. In *Campbell v. Campbell*, 19 Gr. 254, the principle was applied by Spragge, C., in a case of sale of lands authorised by a special Act of the legislature.

It seems apparent that there was no intention to convert the property for all purposes. If that had been the intention it would have been very easy to have said so. The other persons beneficially interested in the property were not petitioners for or parties to the legislation. There is no reason for attributing to the legislature an intention to go beyond what was asked for. The language of the concluding part of sec. 2 repels the existence of any greater intention. Indeed, it indicates a contrary intention. And it is putting no strained construction upon the language to give it the meaning which it seems obvious it was intended to express, that