

In this way therefore the civil service pension is recognised as a deferred annuity corresponding more or less to the difference between the salary received and the salary which would be payable if there had been no pension. From this point of view the system is really a contributory one, and it is so regarded in the report prepared for the United States Government by Mr. H. D. Brown (61st Congress, 2nd session, Senate Document, No. 290 of 1910). It is interesting to compare the experiences of that prolific hive of state systems, New Zealand. There pensions, without contributions, were granted in 1858. In 1871 they were abolished, but one month's pay was granted for each year of service. In 1886 a retirement fund was established, and in 1893 compulsory insurance was substituted. Both systems worked unsatisfactorily, and in 1908 an Act was passed setting up a contributory system, and providing for a pension on the British scale plus an annual allowance to widows and young children. This arrangement has given general satisfaction, and the press, though recognizing that a heavy charge would be laid on the revenue, was favourable to it. Here the contributory character of the system is open, but there is no material difference in principle between this and the British arrangement, except as regards the provision for widows and orphans.

This last provision is required to cover completely the requirements of the civil servant, and in the recently granted power of election and in the Widows' and Orphans' Fund established in several colonies the consideration is recognised. It must be admitted, however, that the case for such provision is not on all fours with that of ordinary pensions for the life of civil servants. Such pensions are really necessary to keep the service efficient. Without them many men would remain in office when long past the power to be of useful service, and in the govern-

ment service of this or any country it would be impossible to prevent this. It is this difficulty which has brought up the question in the United States. Mr. Brown states: "There is one problem of the service, however, that the law (Civil Service Law) has not solved, and that is the problem of superannuation. Without provision for retirement of the aged officeholder a law which in practical operation insures him a permanent tenure of office works an injustice to the Government, since it permits the retention in the service of many who have outlived their usefulness. It is true that the law does specifically provide for the removal of the incompetent on the proper record of the existence of incompetency, but such a provision has proved to be inadequate where incompetency is the result of old age. The majority of executive officials are undoubtedly too tender-hearted to dismiss a subordinate whose only faults are attributed to his weight of years. The result is that he is allowed to remain, quite unfit to perform his duties, practically a pensioner, and the work he is unable to do is divided among the younger clerks. . . . Many of them are past 80, and nonagenarians have occasionally been on the Government pay roll. Paralytics are sometimes brought to office in wheeled chairs, and it frequently happens that a wife or child escorts the head of the house to his desk each day."

These are no doubt extreme cases, but it is clear that government servants in large numbers remain on in the United States long after their efficiency has been seriously impaired. It may be suggested that there should be, as in this country, a compulsory age for retirement, with provision for extensions in instances where they are plainly desirable, but it is difficult to carry out this system when it would lead to severe hardship in great numbers of cases. The result is that in the United States the country pays as much and