

the mind independently of it. Applied to general and abstract ideas, this is *realism* revived in full force, when we might have thought that it had received its final blow, and belonged only to history; but the language used carries us much further, and expresses something so contrary to familiar facts and plain evidence that I hardly know how to treat it.

When a Berkleyan denies altogether the existence of anything external to the mind, I understand his reasoning, and perhaps think it plausible, though I may fancy that I can see the fallacy of it, but if a material universe and a bodily frame of man furnished with senses, be admitted at all; if sensations themselves have any reality: I cannot comprehend the denial that the mind's copy of the sensation is derived from the sensation. The doctrine maintained on my own side I shall explain more fully as I proceed; the assertion incapable of evidence and made to give consistency to a theory, which I have brought under your notice, scarcely admits of argumentative treatment. It seems to me to be in itself a condemnation of the system which requires it.

It appears from what has been stated that Sensationalism professes to be a carrying out of Mr. Locke's leading ideas, by further examination of the nature and origin of that class of mental states of which his explanations are obviously incomplete or unsatisfactory. Some supporters of the doctrine, like James Mill, prefer not to meddle at all with the physical part of the question. To others this appears of no small importance in the way of evidence, and fairly within the reach of investigation. The actual dependence of sensation—though the sensations themselves belong to the mind,—on the nervous system, and this part of the frame forming the link of connection between mind and body, are truths physiologically established, generally admitted, and indeed only to be questioned by those who deny that we know anything but mind, and run into all the extravagances of a spiritual scepticism. Sensations then depend upon or uniformly accompany some kind of action or excitement of the nerves, and through them of the brain. But there are good and well known proofs that a sensation is not instantaneous, but continues as a mental state when the object no longer affects the nerve, and gradually fades away; which fact implies, of course, the continuance in the brain of the action whatever it be which caused the mental change called the sensation. We also know that there arise in our minds states which we recognise as copies or revivals of the sensations when no external