

God. At the outset he must grasp clearly what his task is at this point. What is meant by the proof of the divine existence, and in what sense can the existence of God be proved? Are those right who, following the Kantian criticism, say that the divine existence cannot be proved? If they are not right, wherein is their error? Here the apologete will be wise to take strong middle ground, showing that he does not undertake to prove the existence of God by a strict deductive or demonstrative mode of reasoning, and yet asserting that the theistic proofs are of real logical value in establishing the objective validity of the native belief in God. The apologete will not undertake to prove the existence of a God of whom he is entirely ignorant, or in whom he has no simple belief, but he will show that the native constitutional belief in the divine existence is a logical and rational belief, which rests on good reasons and is supported by strong evidence. The apologete will also show that the theistic proof consists of many branches, and that these must be viewed cumulatively. It is a cable with numerous strands, and not a chain made up of many links. Its argumentative force does not depend on the strength of its weakest proof, but on the combined result of all its lines of proof bound together in one complex inductive process, which may be termed the theistic inference.

The apologete will find it difficult to classify the theistic proofs in a satisfactory way. The old division into *a priori* and *a posteriori* is good only so far, for many of the proofs embrace both factors. The following classification, though not free from defects, may serve his purpose: First, Those arguments wherein the materials of proof are drawn from the nature and contents of the human mind, and which may therefore be termed *psychical*. Here the argument from the native theistic belief, as the bridge between the psychology and ontology of theism, ought to be first considered; and then the proofs from the nature of truth and the conditions of certitude, from the notion of a necessary or all perfect being and from the idea of the infinite, would naturally follow in order. A second general class of theistic proofs would include those which are based on the principal of *causality*. Here the apologete must hold by a true doctrine of causation, which gives a place to the elements of sufficient reason and efficiency; and then he may proceed to unfold the causal arguments, setting