enormity, and most certainly of very great rarity in this country. You kept your wife shut up in a room for one year, and this is almost as bad an offence as anyone can well conceive, and an offence which no man can regard with other feelings than those of indignation and surprise—indignation that she should have been imprisoned by you, shut out from all communication with her friends and society; and surprise that she should so long have submitted to your cruel treatment. You now seem to think that you have made atonement for her wrongs by giving her liberty from you, and settling upon her one-half of her own property. In my opinion that is not atonement enough. You ought to have settled all upon her, and to have given her something from your own, and have begged her pardon for the ill-treatment you have shown her. I must also state *that a prosecution is not the property of those who institute it to deal with it as they think fit.* The public have a higher interest in having redress rendered and wrong punished, to deter others from offending in like manner; and men are not to think that they can treat their wives as you have done, and escape without punishment. Acting upon the depositions that I have before me, and the public object which I have mentioned, I now sentence you to twelve months' imprisonment with hard labour."

There are few, if any, who will not admit that this is by no means too great a punishment, when we observe that the object of the prisoner in so treating his wife was to get rid of her, that he might enjoy her property without the incumbrance of her presence. Had the learned judge been hood-winked by the seeming humility of the plea of guilty, and consented to be led by the wishes of the prosecutor, as is but too much the modern practice, there would have been afforded additional ground for the cry which is even now daily gaining ground, that the criminal law of this country is directed merely to the protection of property, and that the old system of "eric" is practically being restored amongst us. We congratulate the country that Mr. Baron Bramwell has taken occasion to vindicate the rights of the public, as opposed to the desire of the parties, and has declined to permit the court to be made the instrument of what is, in effect, if not in form, composition of a misdemeanour. We are the more impressed with the importance of this judgment as we find that the principle on which it rests is not always acted upon. We have read with deep regret the report of a case *Ex parte Dobson, Re Wilson*, 1 N. R. 379) in which the Lords Justices of appeal in Chancery permitted a bankrupt, whose prosecution they had actually ordered, to go free on payment by his friends of a sum of money sufficient *to buy off the opposing creditors.*—*Solicitors' Journal.*

PROMISE v. PERFORMANCE.

The case of William Sladden, a bankrupt solicitor, affords a striking commentary on the great suit of "Promise *v.* Performance." Here is an unhappy mortal who, only last year, was distributing circulars — one of which was sent to us from the country, where, we understand, they circulated freely —whereby he offered to conduct intending defaulters through the labyrinths of "section 192," at fabulously low rates. When "a solicitor" offers to transact all the business connected with the drawing-up and registering of composition deeds for a fee which one of our correspondents informed us amounted to ten shillings less than the stamps which were to be paid for out of that fee, we might, perhaps, if not very gullable, conclude that he knew but little of the matter. Still we could scarcely have expected so extraordinary a proof of incompetence for the particular function in question, as this bankrupt has supplied. He has, unquestionably, shown himself quite unequal to the task which he undertook, and it may be that that has partly to account for Mr. William Sladden's present position. From what transpired (on the 21st instant,) it appears that "the bankrupt had executed no less than three deeds of composition, the first bearing date the 23rd of November, 1863, the second the 21st of March, 1864, and the third, the 21st of June, 1864. All these deeds proved to be *bad in law*, and eventually he was compelled to petition." Difficulties innumerable have been met with in respect of composition deeds under the Bankruptcy Act, but this is one of the most remarkable illustrations of two well-known proverbs which has ever came under our notice. *Verbum sapienti.—Solicitors' Journal.*

MAGISTRATES, MUNICIPAL & COMMON SCHOOL LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS AND LEADING CASES.

Registry Act — Separation of City from County—Copies of Books.—The registrar of the county of Frontenac, after the city of Kingston was separated from the county for registration purposes, furnished to the registrar for the city a statement of titles to land before separate books were kept for the city. The plaintiff (the registrar for the county before the separation) then sued the city of Kingston for these copies. It was *held*, however, that the plaintiff was not bound to furnish them, and that the defendants were not obliged to pay for them, the case being one not provided for by the act: (*Durand* v. *City of Kingston*, 14 U. C. C. P. 439.)

Municipal Law — Application to unseat Alderman—Relator. — The Con. Stat. U. C. cap. 54 (Municipal Act), sec. 127, has rather