recognised—viz., the less the intrinsic merit of the subject, the more elaborate the accompanying jargon.

We are all very familiar with the Euclid jargon. Some of us, indeed, have somehow come to believe that no proof of proposition can possibly be valid unless it is presented in this orthodox form.

A modern Euclid for the use of schools is sometimes a model of soul-destroying systematisation. I have before me such a work in which the process of arriving at the conclusion that two angles of a triangle are equal if the sides opposite to them are equal, reminds me of the process of walking across a lawn over the surface of which have been stretched innumerable threads in various directions for the purpose of tripping up the unwary.

The number of heads under which a well-taught modern boy will arrange the most simple proposition is wonderful: "general enunciation," "particular enunciation," "hypothesis," "construction," "demonstration," "conclusion" must all figure, or else the proof is "no good." Only a boy who has been careless says, "if two triangles have three sides of the one equal to three sides of the other, the triangles are equal in all respects"—a very simple truth which I received once in the following form from a boy who was much more careful of the orthodox jargon: "if two triangles have two sides of the one respectively equal to two sides of the other each to each, and likewise also their bases, or third sides, equal, then shall the three angles of the one triangle be equal to the three angles of the other triangle, and the triangles shall be equal in every respect."

Observe that in the Euclid jargon nothing ever simply "is"—it always 'shall be."

In finding fault with Euclid as a book for beginners I have, of course, no right to charge it with the enormous number of definitions, and the dissertations on the various kinds of propositions ("positive," "contra-positive," &c.) which some of the school-books set right in front of the beginner before the first proposition of the first Book is reached.

Still, it is by no means the paragon of logical clearness that it is commonly alleged to be. Take, for instance, its very first definition: "a point is that which has no parts." This is an excellent definition of *absolute nonentity*, but not of anything that can be pictured in the mind. Some