

the desirability of this limitation, which it seems might create serious difficulties for the future, when other countries besides the USA will presumably be exporting special fissionable materials and nuclear equipment. The paradoxical situation would then arise in which registration was enforced for [Ligne manquante dans l'original /Line missing in original] into bombs, while leaving free sales of special fissionable materials and reactors, both of which are used directly in the production of nuclear weapons. We should also, from the special Canadian point of view, be reluctant to accept a limitation which, in appearance at least, is even now discriminatory against the exporters of natural uranium.

4. If, however, these difficulties can be overcome, we should probably be ready to go along with the registration proposal, which is consistent with our established position of support for the Agency and appears to be a natural and necessary extension of the proposed control system, the scope of which could otherwise be severely limited. In the event that the attempt to get the same undertaking from other members of the Agency were to fail, we should of course have to review our position.

5. With reference to the adoption of bilateral controls compatible with those of the Agency, the USA is already fully aware of our policy in this respect by which we have required a bilateral agreement with provisions for Agency-type safeguards before permitted exports of nuclear material and facilities, except for small quantities of uranium for research and development purposes under a cumulative total of 2500 lbs for each recipient country. We have several times in the past (and most recently at the meeting of officials held in Washington last September 3) given our assurance of our willingness to continue this limitation, provided other Western suppliers continue to observe the same restriction. Any uncontrolled sales, or a failure on the part of Agency members to agree by the end of the Fourth General Conference (October 1960) upon the safeguards system called for by the statute would of course create a new situation.

Following for Vienna (for action) and Geneva (for information)

6. You should be guided by the above in any discussions at the suppliers meeting and Board of Governors. Please inform us at once of any significant reactions to the USA note.

674.

DEA/14002-2-6-40

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in United States  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 50

Washington, January 11, 1960

CONFIDENTIAL. CANADIAN EYES ONLY. OPIMMEDIATE.

Reference; Your Tel ET-25 Jan 7.

Repeat Vienna (OpImmediate) from Geneva, London, Geneva, T&C Ottawa from Ottawa (Information).

SAFEGUARDS: USA NOTE DÉCEMBER 29/59

We conveyed the contents of your reference telegram to Winfree of State Department. His comments were as follows:

2. In reply to the question raised in your paragraph 2 he said USA visualized that all, repeat all, sales would be registered, this being the only way that one would know that a country was approaching the ten ton figure mentioned in Annex I and be able to assess the effect of any one sale on the attachment of safeguards.