

matter is this, and it is time, and it is right, that that truth should be known, the suzerain state cannot protect us as against the United States, and, therefore, that suzerain state has no right, as far as the United States are concerned, to claim from us that obedience which she would have a right to claim if she was able and willing to protect us, as Mr. Chamberlain put it, in our admitted legal rights. Sir, we knew this before. Those of us who were not blind and deaf to the whole situation, saw that this was the case the moment the first Treaty of Washington was concluded, and the moment Great Britain informed us that she was unable to obtain compensation for Canada for the wrong which had been admittedly perpetrated on our territory by American citizens, although it was as clear as daylight that the Americans could advance no argument which would justify them, or justify any arbitrators in admitting their claims for damages in the case of the *Alabama* and her consorts, which did not go with tenfold more force to justify the people of Canada in demanding that their claims should be considered for wrongs done them in time of peace by Fenian marauders on our shores. Sir, I say that was clear from 1871, I say that is now beyond all possibility of dispute. I say that it follows, therefore, that the hon. gentleman is quite right, and that I am quite right, in saying that we must make, from this time forth, the best bargain we can with the United States, and that we must do it alone. Mr. Speaker, it is worth while, in this connection, to call attention to a very remarkable document which was laid upon the Table of the House, that is, the personal and unofficial letter written by Mr. Bayard to Sir Charles Tupper, under date, Washington, 31st May, 1887. I think, Sir, that this House will do well to ponder on what Mr. Bayard has there said:

“WASHINGTON, D.C., 31st May, 1887.

“MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—The delay in writing you has been unavoidable. In the very short interview afforded by your visit I referred to the embarrassment arising out of the gradual practical emancipation of Canada from the control of the mother country and the consequent assumption by that community of attributes of autonomous and separate sovereignty, not, however, distinct from the Empire of Great Britain. The awkwardness of this imperfectly developed sovereignty is felt most strongly by the United States, which cannot have formal relations with Canada, except directly and as a colonial dependency of the British Crown, and nothing could better illustrate the embarrassment arising from this amorphous condition of things than by the volumes of correspondence published severally this year relating to the fisheries by the United States, Great Britain, and the Government of the Dominion. The time lost in this circumlocution, although often most regrettable, was the least part of the difficulty, and the indirectness of appeal and reply was the most serious feature, ending, as it did, very unsatisfactorily.

“It is evident that the commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of Canada and those of the United States has grown into too vast proportions to be exposed much longer to this wordy triangular duel, and more direct and responsible methods should be resorted to.”

I say that is plain common sense on the part of Mr. Bayard, who thoroughly well understood the position of Canada toward the United States and towards England; and I regretted to find that the Minister of Finance, whom I thought would have been disposed, as he appeared to be in his reply to Mr. Bayard, to have accepted and endorsed Mr. Bayard's statement, should, on the other hand, have declared that he thought it was infinitely more desirable for us to deal with the United States under the aegis and protection of Great Britain. I, for one, wholly and entirely repudiate that part of the contention of the Minister of Finance. I say that Canada has grown to that stature that in dealing with the United States she ought to be allowed to deal directly; and I say it will be tenfold more to the interests of the people of Canada that we should deal directly with the United States, without reference to Downing-street or the British ambassador at Washington either. There is another inference that must be drawn from the very striking language that the Minister of Finance has used, and that is this: It appears to me to be only too clear that Canada lost, and the Government lost, a very great opportunity in

this matter. It appears to me the Government, besides losing a great opportunity, placed us in a most humiliating position, and they ran a very great risk. When I come to examine this correspondence which passed between Mr. Bayard and the hon. gentleman opposite, I cannot but feel that in all human probability, if we could pierce through the diplomatic secrecy which inevitably enshrouds these negotiations, the House would find that when the hon. Minister met Mr. Bayard, as I think he did in Easter, 1887—I think I am correct in that—several weeks before these letters were written, when the hon. gentleman was brought face to face with Mr. Bayard, when he realised where we were and whither we were drifting, he and Mr. Bayard must then have come to the conclusion, which Mr. Bayard announces in his letter, that the real and true means for the extrication of Canada from all these difficulties was a treaty of unrestricted reciprocity almost identically on the lines that I myself have proposed. Why, this is what Mr. Bayard indicates. Does any one suppose that Mr. Bayard on 31st May, 1887, five or six weeks after he had conferred with the hon. gentleman, would have made that proposition unless he had some good reason to suppose that it would be acceptable to the Minister of Finance at all events? Sir, I believe that the Minister of Finance in that respect was decidedly in advance of his colleagues, and that if they had given him a free hand, if they had allowed him in 1887, in April or May, when he met Mr. Bayard, to reply to the invitation which Mr. Bayard gave in that paper, we might have had unrestricted reciprocity to-day, and I believe that would have suited the hon. gentleman, who had, at all events, inclination enough, and who had intelligence enough to understand how vastly superior such a mode of settling the difficulty would have been to the one to which we have had recourse. But that opportunity passed, that opportunity was lost; and when later on, just on the eve of the presidential election, the hon. gentleman did then make a sort of proposition in that direction, then, of course, we could not be surprised that the American authorities should tell him under those circumstances they were not at liberty to undertake negotiations which they might have undertaken and might have successfully carried out some eighteen months ago. I have said this country is humbled. I do not mean to say that this country is necessarily humbled from concluding this treaty, but this country is humbled in this: That its recognised Government has advanced pretensions, has made declarations, has done acts which are wholly and utterly inconsistent with the line that they now call upon Parliament to take. Why, in the outset of the papers submitted we are told:

“The fisheries could not be preserved to our people if every one of the United States fishing vessels that were accustomed to swarm along our coasts could claim the right to enter our harbors, to post a letter or send a telegram or buy a newspaper, to obtain a physician in case of illness or a surgeon in case of accident, to land or bring off a passenger, or even to lend assistance to the inhabitants in fire, flood or pestilence or to buy medicine or to purchase a new rope.”

In other words, if American vessels were allowed to enter the three-mile limit the Minister of Justice declared that our fisheries could not be preserved and our inshore fisheries would be worthless. And then the hon. gentleman goes on to state on another occasion:

“Such a surrender on the part of Canada would involve the abandonment of a valuable portion of the national inheritance of the Canadian people, who would certainly visit with just reprobation those who were guilty of so serious a neglect of the trusts committed to their charge.”

I might go on and multiply these quotations *ad nauseam*, but these are enough to show clearly and distinctly that the hon. gentleman took, during the negotiations, an entirely different position from that which the Government occupied twelve months ago. They have done the very things which they declared they could not do without surrendering the national inheritance of Canada. According to their own