

important one because it shows the extent of the implications of the military alliance.

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This concerns our immigration policy. Most Canadians I think have believed that Canada has been in some sense an asylum, as the United States has been, for people from the British Isles and Europe. They believe that as a mark of our independence and liberalism that we have instructed our immigration officials not to enforce foreign laws or not to snoop into the political beliefs or military obligations of intending immigrants. Had we done that previously, a large number of Sir Clifford Sifton's immigrants in sheepskin coats would have been sent back to fight for the Imperial armies of Russia or Austria-Hungary. So that, when young American war-protestors sought asylum here and a number of them had difficulty getting in, the draft dodgers, public concern mounted and the immigration policy was modified and they were allowed in, but at the same time—and this is the important point—the department did make a quiet reservation. It claimed there was a difference between draft-resisters and deserters and it continues, as was demonstrated by four or five impulsive young students from York University a week or so ago, to reject deserters from the American Army. To me, the important point is that it does so as policy, although most Canadians undoubtedly assume that if an American refuses to fight in Viet Nam and deserts when he is ordered overseas he will not on that account be denied admission to Canada.

In the spring of 1967, I asked the department on what grounds it pursued the policy of rejecting, as policy, deserters. At first I was told it was an obligation springing from our NATO commitment. When I objected that I could not find any commitment under NATO arrangements they said it sprang from the NATO Visiting Forces Act. Well, it does not, of course, because that governs forces on service in Canada, and I want to quote from the letter I have which finally cleared the point up. It is an official letter in reply to an official inquiry that I made, and it says:

It is quite true that the NATO Visiting Forces Act is applicable only to foreign military personnel actually on service in Canada, and that consequently a foreign soldier who comes to Canada after deserting somewhere else is not subject to its provisions. I am sure you will agree, however, that neither Canada nor any other member of NATO would be acting in the spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty if it granted immunity within its borders to deserters from the military forces of other members of the Alliance.

I think you can go through a very broad range of Canadian policies in all matters and find the direct impact upon our thinking and policy of our military

alignment, and my chief case is that in most cases the impact is illiberal, it works against political independence and it does so unnecessarily because the military alignment does not in any sense protect us. It does, of course, as Mr. Robert McNamara said before a Senate Committee in the United States in 1965, by putting a couple of Bomarc sites here act as missile bait for Russian missiles, but I scarcely see that that is defence.

There is one final point, and that is the argument which I very often hear that because we are so timid within the alliance system we would probably be no bolder if we merely withdrew from the system. That is probably a strong argument. There is an answer, I think, however and that is, if, as a result of this present review, we were to decide upon military non-alignment, that decision would have to rest upon a political debate that would go far beyond these walls. It would be a debate which, as I suggested, would have to concern every substantive issue in domestic and foreign policy, and if that debate were to produce a majority for non-alignment it would also produce a majority which would demand extensive public planning of investment, resources development, cultural growth and the production probably of a limited range of conventional armaments under public ownership in Canada.

I can see no other way than by closely examining the total implications of our military alignment by which we can really define the true interest of this country or, indeed, discover the extent to which Canadians are willing to pursue those interests.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**The Chairman:** Thank you very much Professor McNaught. Mr. Fairweather.

**Mr. Fairweather:** There are just two or three matters I would like to pursue. One is the recognition of China. Do you think there is any validity in the idea that the United States welcomes Canada's initiative and that really to have a press secretary replying to what is a fundamental change in policy shows that the U.S. really rather likes this as a pilot project for their own inevitable recognition of China?

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**Professor McNaught:** Mr. Fairweather, I do not like the use of the word "inevitable" as an historian, but in general I think I do agree. We are obviously very much too close to this particular development and have very little documentation on it, but I agree with your surprise about the extremely limited and modified response from the United States to our preliminary talks. Thus, it seems to me at least reasonably open to speculate that our moves toward recognition of China are not disagreeable to the United States and possibly that is part of the reason they are now being made.