

pectations we presumably cannot afford to arouse and there are margins of tolerance beyond which we might do more harm than good to the cause of human rights in Eastern Europe. But within those margins we shall be expected to do what we can to give substance to the commitments we collectively undertook at Helsinki. It is we, after all, who introduced the whole human dimension into the Final Act and it remains central to our conception of *détente*.

It is clear that we shall not be going to Belgrade to write another Final Act. The agenda embodied in that document offers us an adequate basis for forward movement. To expand it now would be to put a premium on poor performance. The task of our representatives at Belgrade, as I see it, is to make an objective and dispassionate assessment of how far we have come; to identify the impediments that have stood in the way of more even and more satisfactory progress; and to lay down some guidelines to ensure better performance in the future. The prospect of the Belgrade Conference has already stimulated action in areas where action might not otherwise have been taken and I imagine that, at the end of the day, it will be in our joint interest to provide for a continuation of this multilateral process, if only as an incentive to more faithful implementation.

Of course, even the more faithful implementation of the provisions of the Final Act will not be enough to sustain the momentum of *détente*. The other side tell us that they see *détente* as being irreversible. I am sure that no sane government, in the present conjuncture of forces, would want to have it otherwise. But *détente* will not be irreversible unless it is made irreversible. And it will not be made irreversible unless it is seen as a process that extends well beyond the boundaries of the Final Act.

The attempt is made from time to time to define *détente*. This is useful up to a point, but there is also a danger that to define is to set limits and to set limits is not only to include but to exclude. In the Canadian view, there is no present advantage to us in delimiting *détente* with such sharp precision. We much prefer the very broad definition of *détente* to which we all subscribed in the preamble to the Final Act, which is to overcome distrust and increase confidence.

Many of us have said that *détente* is indivisible. This is because, in the end, confidence is indivisible. The persistent build-up of military capabilities in the Soviet Union is a case in point. We cannot easily reconcile a climate of *détente* with an arms race that shows no signs of abating. Nor can we expect confidence to be established between states in Europe when situations outside Europe are being turned by one of the participating states to its unilateral advantage.

The whole notion of the ideological struggle is another obstacle to *détente*. Sooner or later, it is bound to become intervention in someone's internal affairs. It is not that the notion as such needs to give us grounds for undue concern. Our ideas can stand on their own merits and on the merits of the societies that profess them. But we cannot accept a set of ground-rules by which the ideological struggle waged in one direction is declared outside the bounds of *détente*, whereas the affirmation of our own ideas is condemned, to use Mr. Gromyko's own words, as poisoning the atmosphere and