

threats of nuclear blackmail". At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. delegates suggested that such assurances might take the form of an Assembly resolution.

More recently, Chairman Kosygin has proposed a type of indirect assurance under which the nuclear powers would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory. While this proposal has certain attractions, we must recognize the difficulty in establishing as a fact whether nuclear weapons are present in certain areas or not.

A United Nations resolution signifying the intention of members to provide or support assistance to non-nuclear states subject to nuclear attack, or threats of such attack, might provide a form of useful collective assurance in no way incompatible with other and more direct arrangements. Perhaps we should explore this possibility.

Mention should be made of another difficult question, that of safeguards. Over the past decade, considerable progress has been made in elaborating the concept and in developing the practical application of the means of preventing nuclear materials which are supplied for peaceful purposes from being diverted to the manufacture of weapons. As a major uranium exporter committed to supplying nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes, Canada will continue to support strongly steps to bring about general acceptance of international safeguards because they must be general, either under the system developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency or through equivalent arrangements of an organization such as Euratom. In the common effort to contain the nuclear threat, we regard safeguards as one of the important instruments which the international community has at its disposal.

Canada has participated actively in the working out of the IAEA safeguards system. Only a few days ago, we demonstrated again our support for and confidence in that system, in respect to our agreement with Japan for co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We have signed an agreement in Vienna under which the International Atomic Energy Agency assumes the responsibility for administering the safeguards incorporated in the Japan-Canada Agreement.

If a non-proliferation treaty is to be effective, to inspire confidence, and to endure, it will also require some means of verifying that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are being carried out. This should include a provision to ensure that peaceful nuclear activities and materials are not being used clandestinely for military purposes.

If safeguards are to be acceptable and effective, they must be applicable to all states. These recognized systems of safeguards, which are already applied by many countries to transactions, my own country among them, involving transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, should be applied to cover all international