

## FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

## FRANCE.

**FOREIGN MERCENARIES.**—A correspondent of the *Times* sends the following gossip from Paris:—"I alluded in a previous letter to certain propositions made by a French company to raise in France a legion for the service of the English government. It appears that the company engages to supply from 10,000 to 25,000 men within the shortest possible time, half the number that may be agreed upon to be ready in fifteen days at the utmost. In order to effect that undertaking, it requires that it shall be permitted to recruit in France; or in neutral countries, men who have been liberated from military service, and on whom otherwise their governments have no special claim. It is stated that the English government is disposed to entertain the propositions of the company, and only awaits, to enter on its execution, the assent of the French government."

## HOLLAND.

A continental correspondent of the *Morning Advertiser* writes:—"A very unfortunate event has just occurred at the Hague; an event of so distressing a nature that I should hesitate to narrate it, but that it comes to me from unquestionable authority.—The King of Holland lately went to visit one of his mistresses, and found one of his aides-de-camp closeted with her. The King rushed upon the officer and stabbed him. The wound, it is said, has proved fatal, and great exertions are being made in high places to keep this horrible tragedy from the public."

## RUSSIA.

The *Christian Times* states that a most atrocious act of cruelty is alleged to have been perpetrated by the Russian authorities in the Crimea. For a long period a colony of Moravians have been established in that country, who first settled there when partial religious toleration was the law of Russia. These brethren have always acted upon principles, in respect to the unlawfulness of war, similar to those held by the Society of Friends, and, by the aid of some influential Quakers in this country, obtained, many years since, from the Russian government, the privilege of exemption from military service. Of late, however, they have been subjected to the most harassing persecutions for their refusal to carry arms, and still persisting in that refusal, 300 have been put to death!

## WAR IN THE EAST.

With that profound political foresight, and admirable military genius which have hitherto distinguished their conduct of the war, the British government have just withdrawn a section of their Indian army, at the moment when all Central Asia seems convulsed with Muscovite arms and intrigue. The same mail that announces the departure of two cavalry regiments from Bombay, to seek a bloody grave before Sebastopol, informs us that the people have revolted against the native rulers, to friendly England, in Cabul and Turkistan—and that the Candahar chiefs have acknowledged fealty to the King of Persia, demanding assistance against Dost Mahommed, the wily old Asiatic Prince, who had only just completed his alliance with Lord Dalhousie.

Added to this, the prospect of a new Burmese campaign has already become imminent. It appears that the Ambassador from the court of Ava, during his last interview with Lord Dalhousie, electrified that nobleman by announcing that his master insisted upon the restoration of all the Burmese territory which had been annexed by England.

*Blackwood* for February has a very clever article, on the disasters which have befallen our arms in the Crimea—from which we lay some extracts before our readers.—"Whence have come our dangers?" is the question which the writer discusses; and he answers—From the miserable economy adopted by the Government, in obedience to the mercenary demands of the Manchester school—unfortunately for England's welfare, and for England's honor the political party which has virtually ruled the country for the last quarter of a century:—

"Even in an economical point of view this wretched system of reduction, which has so often been adopted by the English during peace, is as short-sighted and pernicious as it is perilous. It inevitably leads to the recurrence, and multiplies tenfold the cost of war. Deprived of all consideration, and respect from the foreign powers by whom it is surrounded, a rich and renowned, but disarmed state speedily becomes the object only of envy and cupidity to its warlike and rapacious neighbors. Attack, attracted by riches, prompted by jealousy, suggested by ambition, is encouraged by the absence of defence, the prospect of helplessness. The prestige of former fame, the remembrance of past triumphs, may for a time protect it, and conceal present weakness by the halo of former renown; but that cannot be expected to last very long. The inevitable time will come, the hour of danger will arrive, when the passions of ambitious and penniless rapacity will be let loose on the wealthy and unprotected state—and how is it then to be defended? Enormous efforts, gigantic expenditure, will be required to avert disaster or subjugation. Even if they are made, success can in the end be attained only at the cost of immense sacrifices of blood and treasure, and after the sufferings of a long, hazardous, and burdensome war. Four-fifths of the debt which now oppresses the industry and weighs down the national strength of England, has been occasioned by the selfish parsimony of former times. Danger is averted by preparation; war is often avoided by the inspiring of dread; if begun, it is shortened by the exercise of strength. Had four millions a year additional been expended on the army between 1784 and 1793; Paris would have been taken in the first campaign, and nineteen years of subsequent most costly war, and the contraction of £600,000,000 of debt, would have been avoided. If we had had 100,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry and artillery, and 80,000 militia in the British Islands in the beginning of 1854,

the Czar would never have ventured upon war; or if he did so, he might, with an able Government directing the attack, have lost Cronstadt and Sebastopol in the first campaign. It was the defenceless state of England which prompted the Emperor Nicholas to his invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia in July, 1853. Had we been even moderately prepared, we would never have crossed the Pruth. If we would discover the real authors of the war, we shall find them in those who counselled admiring and assenting multitudes at Manchester that the age of war was passed, that we should disband our troops and sell our ships of the line. Their names are Richard Cobden, John Bright, and Joseph Sturge.

"Xenophon says that, if Athens had been an insular state, it would have conquered Sparta in the Peloponnesian war, because it could, with its command of the sea, have ruined its adversary, while its adversary could not have reached it. That advantage which Athens wanted England possessed; but it has been all but thrown away by the infatuation of our people and the blind submission to popular dictation of our rulers. Wafted on board its powerful navy, its magnificent steamships, the army of England could in a fortnight have reached either Cronstadt or Sebastopol, while the forces of Russia were hermetically sealed within their granite bastions. If we had had such an army, what marvellous, what decisive success might, under able direction, have been attained in the first campaign! If 40,000 men had accompanied Sir C. Napier to the Baltic, where would now have been the fleets of Sweaborg and Cronstadt? Burnt in their harbors, or prizes at Spithead. If a reserve of 30,000 men had been at hand in Malta to reinforce the army which conquered at the Alma, Sebastopol would long ere this have been taken. A real investment would have been made; and while half of our army pressed the fortress alike on the north and south, the other half would have covered the siege, and, if attacked, renewed the triumphs with which the campaign opened. Decisive success was within our power, if we had possessed, when hostilities broke out, a force at all commensurate to our national strength or material resources. If we have not gained it, and have only achieved barren victories, these are owing to the glorious chivalry of our officers, the indomitable courage of our men, which have, in some degree, compensated, though at the expense of their own blood, the long-continued blindness and infatuation of the country, which rendered useless all the immense advantages that Providence had put into our hands.

"Two other particulars deserve especial notice.—The first is, that the department of the army in which the superiority of the Russians has been most apparent, is the very one in which the English, in the pride of intellect, expected the most decisive success. We boasted of our science, our mechanical skill, our arts; and the complacent admirers of existing things told us confidently our artillery would at once prove its superiority to the Russian, and that Sebastopol would be 'smashed' in three days. Where are these boasts now? We have defeated the enemy, but it was by the qualities which have descended to our officers and their soldiers from their Norman and Saxon forefathers, but from no aid which we have derived, either from the wisdom and forethought of our popular Government, or the skill or genius of our mechanical people. In both these respects we have been beat by our despotic enemy, outdone by his barbarian subjects. In number and weight of guns, the Russian artillery has shown itself as superior to ours as the Russian administration has, in the raising, feeding, and bringing up of large bodies of soldiers.—Whence this extraordinary difference, so exactly the reverse of everything which, in the pride of civilisation and intellect, we had expected? Simply in this, the one cost money, the other did not. The blood flowing in the veins of our officers, which recalled the chivalry of Richard Cœur-de-Lion, in those of our soldiers the constancy of Agincourt, cost Ministers nothing; but it would have cost them a great deal, and they must have faced a reformed House of Commons five years ago, to produce an artillery and siege equipage superior to what the Czar had collected at the very extremity of his dominions. Thence the victories of Alma and Inkermann won by our soldiers, and the siege of Sebastopol still protracted, amidst heroic constancy, from the long-continued faults of our Government.

"The next circumstance worthy of notice is, that the deficiencies which have appeared in our service have appeared chiefly in those departments where, according to the popular doctrines, we should least have expected them, and the success has been achieved in those where, if their principles were correct, deficiency and ruin were to be expected. There has been no failure in the Guards, headed by the flower of the aristocracy, at the Alma or Inkermann, or in the cavalry led by the chivalry of England in the immortal charges at Balaklava; but can the same be said of the commissariat department, the reserve medical staff, the harbor arrangements at Balaklava, the providing of draught-horses and passable roads at Sebastopol? In these departments, intrusted to the direction of the sons of the middle classes, the deficiencies we all deplore have chiefly appeared."

## INEFFICIENCY OF THE NEW MINISTRY.

(From the *London Times*.)

A noble Roman once received the thanks of the Senate because, at a disastrous crisis, he had not despaired of his country. Yet we confess that our faith in the star of Old England is now very much tried. It is very true that when England is thoroughly convinced that an opinion, or a party, or a Government, is false, or rotten, or unserviceable, it rises and shakes itself with considerable energy; but, that done, the sluggish nature of the animal returns, and it acquiesces without a murmur in some new infliction. So little has it mended itself sometimes by its most frantic efforts of self-vindication, that its last state seems worse than its first. In all seriousness, are we bound to be particularly hopeful, sanguine, exulting, and so forth, at our new Ministerial prospects? Certainly there is a change; the firm has appeared with a new head; and the faulty department has been simplified and invigorated. What has passed too, may operate as a caution for the future. But, dismissing all comparisons with the past, and leaving Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Newcastle in that retirement which we doubt not they are ready to enjoy, let us count and con over our men. The real difficulty, as stated by Lord Grey, and as solved by all the Governments

of Europe except our own, is the position of the War Minister in the Cabinet. Shall we ever put all our strength into the war till the Premier and the War Minister are one? Will any War Minister ever throw himself fairly into the contest so long as he feels that he may be snubbed and checked, for little or for much—in fact, so long as he feels his hands tied, and his arms without their full swing?

But now for the War Department itself. Lord Panmure has always shown administrative power, in a certain routine, under the iron age of the Duke. Something more is wanted, for we have to make reforms and administer them at once. If any Minister starts with the feeling that there has been a great deal of nonsense talked about reform—about the faulty organization of the army—about aristocratic influence, and that it is safer just now to resist than to give way to such cries—in fact, that the British public is the enemy we have most to fear, and not the Czar—then we confidently predict, and most earnestly desire, a speedy and unpleasant termination to his reign—for every day of it will be so much loss to the honor and influence of his country. This may or may not be Lord Panmure's feeling, but, unfortunately, nobody can assure us that it is not. We must add, with a feeling of anxiety almost approaching to consternation as we think of, that his Lordship is liable to fits of the gout that entirely disable him from business for weeks together. As this disorder is well known to be brought on by hard work, or anxiety, it is too possible that, at the very time when a War Minister is most wanted, we shall find ourselves practically without one altogether,—nay, worse than without one, as the War Minister and his office may be in bed together, leaving the whole British world, but unfortunately, not the Russians, to wait till he is about again. With this casualty always in prospect, it becomes a very important question who is to be Under-Secretary of War? Mr. Layard had been designated by report for this office, but we believe he is thought rather too good a man for it—that is, too much of a reformer, and with too strong impressions of what ought to be done. It is with something like dismay that we find it stated by two respectable and generally well-informed contemporaries that Mr. Frederick Peel is to hold this most responsible office. With an illustrious name, and with every advantage, this gentleman has not yet shown a capacity for anything but the merest desk-work. Possibly an office which gave more scope for his powers would elicit hidden virtues; but England cannot afford experiments that cost thousands of men and millions of money to ascertain whether a man is more of a man than he has hitherto shown himself. At all events, "a war to the knife" with Russia is not the proper occasion for risking our all on the possible inspirations of a known mediocrity.

With this future before us let us look to the present. We are told "it is confidently hoped the First Lord of the Admiralty will be well enough to resume his Parliamentary duties by the end of the week." If we remember right this paragraph is periodical, and may be stereotyped for us. With two immense fleets sailing about in the presence of the enemy, and not in the best possible concert with the other arm of the service, besides smaller squadrons and odd frigates scattered about nobody knows where all over the world, and with the evident necessity of an entirely new class of ships, batteries and gunboats, it is far from reassuring to find that Sir James Graham may perhaps, be out of bed sometime before spring. But, proceeding to another appointment, we presume that the office of Commander-in-Chief in Ireland is not an absolute sinecure. It is true that the army in Ireland is left very low, but on that account it may require the better handling, and the man selected to succeed Sir Edward Blakeney, is Lord Seaton, now in his 80th year. The example, at least, of octogenarian appointments is bad. We proceed. One of the most serious disasters of this war has been officially ascribed to the "misconception" of an order, and nothing is so necessary to war as the full possession of the senses. Yet Lord Rokeby, lately sent out to command a division, is said to be "as deaf as a post." Admiral Boxer, having been found incompetent at Constantinople, has been appointed to command at Balaklava—that is to say, at the very port in the whole world where it is now of most importance for us to have a man of first rate ability. He made chaos out of order in the Bosphorus—he is appointed to make order out of chaos at Balaklava.

For our part, we will frankly confess ourselves rather alarmed at the perpetuation of this class of appointments. We are engaged in a death struggle with a Titan whose growth exceeds anything in history, and which, indeed, has sprung into a gigantic empire with the memory of living men. It is all youth and spirit, miles ahead of us, tied by no precedents, bound to no class, hampered by no constitution, scarcely even softened by the sentiment of nationality. It is a mere conspiracy on the largest possible scale for the conquest of the world, with a real autocrat at its head. Its discipline, its tactics, its artillery, its devices are all of the newest, and hitherto it seems to have got the advantage over us, and to have won even the substantial fruits of our very victories. Against this formidable Power, that threatens and impends over modern civilization and the liberties of the Old World, we summon to office octogenarians with one foot in the grave, valetudinarians, "martyrs to the gout," and various other terrible disorders—the blind, the deaf, and the lame; the sons of great men; and, in a word, everybody except men of undoubted ability, with no recommendation but their talents and services. There is no doubt that there exists exactly the same variety of materials in the British and Russian services; but, unfortunately, there is as little doubt that we select what the Russian Government rejects, and reject what they select. They put aside the officer who shows the

smallest unfitness, and degrade for what we should consider a very venial error. Everybody serves with the full knowledge that the Emperor's eye is upon him—and neither merit nor delinquency, achievement nor failure, will pass unnoticed or unremembered.—With such a system, we must not pretend to cope, so long as we refuse to employ the very best men we can find in the whole of the British Empire, in whatever service, under whatever name, and in whatever field of action they have won their reputation; and, we will add, whatever their origin, their politics, or their friends. Perhaps there are inconveniences in such a course. Be it so. But let us choose either one thing or another. Let us not expect to be conquerors in the field, and mere partizans, jobbers, or turf hunters at home.

## AGITATION IN THE FUTURE.

(From the *Toronto Colonist*.)

Have our readers flattered themselves, that with the settlement of the Clergy Reserve question, and the adoption of the elective Legislative Council and the Seigneurial Tenure Bills by the Conservative members of the coalition, there would be a probability of Canada enjoying a little needful quiet for some time to come? Have they imagined, that in giving up the rights of the National Churches, and sacrificing principle to expediency, they have made a friend of the spoiler, and secured a little remnant for the cause of religion and the instruction of the poor?—Have they supposed that, notwithstanding the paralyzing effect of an European war upon our commerce, and especially upon our great national works now in progress, that we may yet hope for so much internal prosperity as would enable us to escape entire ruin and decay?

They might as well have supposed, that the sated wolf would never become hungry again; or that the successful robber would restore his plunder; as to imagine that the man who makes his living by political agitation, will stop short until he is fairly gorged to repletion.

Let the Roman Catholics, whose votes robbed the Protestant Churches of their own, and whose countenance of Reform agitation was the chief cause of its success; let the members of the Churches of England and Scotland who elected secularisationists, from a desire to get rid of religious strife; let the Conservatives who have bestowed their money upon Anti-Clergy Reserve newspapers; read what sort of a political future our contemporary of the *Globe* has in store for them, and remember, that it is their assistance and patronage which have supplied the strength which is to be directed against themselves.

In the *Globe* of yesterday, we find the following pregnant sentences:—

"The recent accession of Mr. Cauchon alarmed the whole Protestant population of Upper Canada.—That movement was a distinct assertion by men in office that they intended to refuse to Upper Canada, Representation by population—to continue and increase in fullness the sectarian school system, to check the working of the voluntary principle in every way in their power; it was a pledge that the rights of the Roman Catholic Church should remain intact, although the property of Protestant bodies has been taken away; it was an assurance that French domination should be henceforth the recognised custom of the country. Is any one foolish enough to believe that Reformers or any other large class of Upper Canadians, are going to submit to all this quietly."

What Protestant, save one so high church in his views as to be hardly worthy of the name, will submit for a moment to the encroachments of popery, to its retention of all the privileges of which Protestantism has been stripped?"

As a key to the above declarations, we need only refer to the *Globe's* recent announcement, that even though he knew (which he did quite well) that the Rouges were annexationists at heart, he would still be prepared to accept them as political allies for his own purposes.

There can be no mistake as to the objects the *Globe* holds out. He speaks plainly enough. Having failed to command political power by all other means, Mr. Brown is resolved to make a last desperate throw for success, even though in so doing he hands Canada over to the United States. Having triumphed over the "rights" of Protestants—[what a boast for a man professing Christianity!]—his next point of attack is upon the "rights" of Roman Catholics.

It is not very difficult to perceive the result of such an agitation if successful. The French of Lower Canada are bound to the Empire by no ties of allegiance, or of patriotism. Assail their "rights," and you sever at once the single cable which binds them to England. And who could blame them for any step which they might take in self-defence? Who could charge them with inconsistency or dishonor, if to protect themselves from spoliation, or by way of revenge upon its perpetrators, they went over bodily to a nation where the rights of property at least are respected.

But is the *Globe* sincere? Does he really desire to trample upon the feelings and opinions of the majority of Lower Canada? Does he even hope to carry the Rouges with him, so as to have a chance of success? We believe we have no such expectation; but that his sole hope and aim is to arouse a fanatical spirit in the Upper Province, which will at least make his newspaper pay, if it does not land him snugly in some fat official berth!

Yes, we have no greater faith, no higher confidence in George Brown than this. Give him a Penitentiary Commissionership—give him the pause, and let him dip his hands deeply enough, and he will blow you hot or cold—advise, moral, "suasion," or threaten people's "rights"—do anything, provided it will but pay!