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In *Paul* v. *Travellers Ins. Co.*, 45 Hun, 318, the Court decided an interesting question arising under an accident insurance policy. The policy covered injury and death through "external, violent and accidental means," but excepted bodily injuries "of which there shall be no external and visible sign upon the body," and death "by the taking of poison, contact with poisonous substances, or inhaling of gas, or by any surgical operation or medical treatment." This policy was held to cover a death by the accidental inhaling of escaping illuminating gas while the insured was asleep. The Court got over the difficulty caused by the words "inhaling of gas" among the various provisions exempting the company from liability, by assuming that the words were used to designate the common uses of gas in dentistry, surgery, etc. This seems rather a violent assumption, but the Court observed, "If the language of the policy is capable of two constructions, that most favorable to the insured should be adopted. It will not do to sacrifice the substance of the contract to the letter, if such a result can be reasonably avoided." The Court also held that the accidental inhaling of escaping gas was a death through violent means.

The New York Court of Appeals, in *Mayor etc., of New York* v. *New Jersey Steamboat Transportation Co.*, June 7, 1887, passed upon what constitutes a ferry. The Court held that a line of boats adapted to carry travellers, with their horses, vehicles and other property, running from pier 18, Hudson river, New York city, to various points on the shore of Staten Island and the New Jersey coast, and return, the round trip making about twenty-four miles, constituted a ferry between New York city and Staten Island. The distance is not so great as to preclude the idea of a ferry, and the business does not lose that character because the boats stop at points on the New Jersey as well as the Staten Island shore.

A Ceylon correspondent of the *Law Journal*, referring to the action of the governor of the colony, in frequently pardoning natives undergoing sentences without first referring to the judges who sentenced them, asks whether it is usual for the Queen to grant free pardons to criminals without referring such cases in the first instance to the tribunals before which they were condemned. The editor replies in the negative. "In the first place, the Queen never grants a free pardon of her own motion at all. If she were to do so, and the Secretary of State disagreed with the act, it would be his duty to resign. That protest is all the sanction provided by the Constitution, and no doubt the criminal would legally be pardoned. The circumstances in Ceylon no doubt are different; but we assume in favour of the Governor that he is his own Secretary of State. The practice of consulting the judges is very much older than the present constitutional relation of the sovereign to the Secretary of State in regard to the prerogative of mercy. When questions of law were involved, the judges were from early times consulted, and the convicted person pardoned or executed according to their decision, a practice which was the origin of the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved. We believe it to be the practice in England, that the Secretary of State never interferes with a conviction without receiving the report of the convicting tribunal, whether judge of the High Court or justice at petty sessions. The practice arises not only in the interests of justice to the convicted person, but in order that the tribunal may vindicate its action, and that there may be no weakening of the judicial authority by any apparent slight being cast on its decision. The Secretary of State is responsible for the maintenance of this practice to Parliament, but in Ceylon the duty exists although there is no mode of enforcing it except by complaint at the Colonial Office."