

JAPS DEFEATED ON THE YALU, REPULSED BY THE RUSSIANS.

Crossed on Pontoon Bridges During the Night.

Charged a Russian Position and Were Driven Back.

Japanese Army Has Crossed the River at Several Points.

Liao-Yang cable says—On April 23 the Russians observed that the Japanese were making preparations to cross the Yalu River.

On the night of April 25 two steamers and two torpedo boats were noticed at the mouth of the river. They approached the shore at daylight, and the Japanese commenced to build a pontoon on the left tributary. A second pontoon was being prepared ten miles up the stream.

At 3 o'clock the same afternoon the Japanese occupied the island of Samohide which they carried pontoon boats, etc.

The night passed quietly, the torpedo boats maintaining a careful watch in case the troops ashore should be attacked, and examining the mouth of the river by searchlights.

At 3.40 next morning the Japanese crossed the river near the village of Tehudiagon, where, however, the Russian outposts commenced firing upon them. The Russian advance guards had been furnished with small gun, and they succeeded in destroying the pontoon constructed near Wiju. The wrecked pontoon was carried away by the current, and further Japanese bridging operations ceased, but the Japanese continued to cross by another pontoon southward of Wiju.

A Japanese column with a battery of artillery approached Turnchen at midday, but the Russian skirmishers met them with sharp firing, evidently giving them trouble, as the Japanese had crossed the river, which made no attempt to answer the Russian fire.

OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED.

Russian Censors Admit Japs Are in Manchuria.

St. Petersburg cable says—The Censors' Committee did not to-night give out the despatches received to-day regarding the movements of the Japanese across the Yalu River. It was intimated that the Japanese had crossed the river, but this was accompanied by a statement that the success of the enemy should in no sense be regarded as an important victory, the Russians having no intention of vigorously contesting the passage, their plan being to annoy the enemy as much as possible.

It is regarded as possible that when the Japanese troops are in sufficient numbers they will march along the Manchurian bank of the Yalu in the direction of Antung, near which lies the road on which the advance can continue to Feng-Hoang-Chang, where the first important stand of the Russians will be made.

A report has been received here, official or otherwise, showing casualties on either side.

The message announces that between the night of the 25th and the morning of the 26th the Japanese forced the passage of the Yalu River by two companies crossing between Tehungjiu (probably Changju), and Siao-poussikhe, about fifty miles north of Antung, the treaty port at the mouth of the Yalu, and places the Japanese some much higher up the river than previous advices had represented. As usual they seem to have conducted the operation in a highly skillful manner, and to have accompanied it by a feint at Tatingkiao, a port near the mouth of the Yalu, and opened by treaty to Japan shortly before the outbreak of the war. Heavy firing is reported as having been heard near Tatingkiao, which must have proceeded from a naval attack, the river being too broad at its mouth to permit of an attack in any other manner, and was in all likelihood accompanied or followed by the disembarkation of a Japanese force on the Liaotung Peninsula.

As the Russian army of occupation was reported to be occupying the line of the Yalu from Antung northward and thus covering the Manchurian crossing by the Japanese at Changju, would cut the enemy's force in two, and place the right wing in serious jeopardy. A good road leads from Antung to Liao-yang, which is nearly equidistant between New-Chwang and Mukden, but with left wing driven to the north and away from the Liao-Yang road the Japanese would have achieved a distinct strategic advantage.

MAY BE DROWNED.

Not Known Whether Crew of Merchantman Escaped.

Tokio cable says—In connection with yesterday's descent of the Russian warships from Vladivostock upon Gensan, and the sinking of a small Japanese steaming vessel, it is reported in several quarters here that the Russian land force, of from 3,000 to 5,000 men, which was being moved southward from Kung-sung, along the coast road, after being captured by the Russian army, is reported to be fleeing from the Russians. Another report, however, says that the inroad of the Russians has had a marked effect in stimulating a friendly feeling with the inhabitants. The garrison of Gensan was recently reinforced with artillery and

lieve that Gen. Kouropatkin would waste time or men in harassing the Japanese right flank in Corea, for their communications are all by the left flank, and they can be easily maintained from the sea. When the Japanese strike it will be in the neighborhood of Port Arthur, and Gen. Kouropatkin knows it. Everything else is mere bluff.

The St. Petersburg correspondent of the Paris Temps and other correspondents in the Russian capital concur in stating that the Japanese continue to cross the Yalu in small bodies, but they add that the Russians do not intend to seriously oppose them.

CHARGED A POSITION.

But Were Repulsed by Russian Battery.

Liao-Yang cable says—The Japanese troops which crossed the Yalu north of Euitjiou (Tehangjiou?) charged, during the night of April 26-27, the Russian position near Lizavena, a village on the Manchurian bank of the Yalu. The Russians, repulsed, but their loss is not known.

Two gunboats steamed up the river to the support of the Japanese, when a Russian field battery at Amisan opened upon them, resulting in a duel, which lasted for twenty minutes. The Russian fire was too hot, and the gunboats were forced to turn and steam out of range.

The Japanese were facilitated in crossing by their occupation of the island of Samilanda.

FRONT OF EIGHTY MILES.

Impossible to Prevent the Japanese Crossing.

St. Petersburg cable says—Disappointment prevails in St. Petersburg, but no official despatches giving details of the operations on the Yalu River have yet been made public. The press despatches are so meagre as to becloud rather than enlighten the people, who are hourly awaiting news.

The Associated Press has obtained from the general staff the following clear statement: "Beginning the passage of the Yalu, the Japanese evidently completed the concentration of two armies along the river, commanded by Gens. Kouropatkin and Oku. Each army is composed of three divisions and three reserve brigades. The total force is 100,000. The Russians on the Manchurian bank of the river are inferior in strength.

"The Japanese commenced the passage of the river, and the Russians realized that it would be impossible to prevent their crossing. The Japanese front extended from Wiju as far as Piekiong, over 80 miles. We faced the possibility that they would cross at two points, and all we could hope was to harass and impede the crossing, for every day gained enabled us to push our preparations and bring up more men.

"We know that the Japanese crossed at two points at least. Their first attempt to force a passage near Chandekow, 20 miles above Wiju, near Siao-poussikhe, on the Pousikhe, a tributary of the Yalu, was successful. This is important, because a road leads from Siao-poussikhe northeast to Kwantien, which commands one of the roads to Mukden.

"It is evident that the Japanese devoted most of their attention to crossing near Wiju. The river here is divided into several channels by islands, the largest of which is Samilanda. Above and below Wiju was bridged at three points.

"Up the stream near Sindiagon the Japanese were watched by a small detachment of Cossacks, but the enemy was practically unopposed. At Turenchen, lower down, our outposts directed fire from a field piece so successfully that they destroyed the moorings and wrecked the pontoons. The enemy was thrown into disorder, and suffered considerable loss. Still further down the stream the Japanese proceeded to make a third attempt at crossing.

"We do not think that the Japanese will attempt to land at Takushan or Tatingkiao, now that they have crossed the Yalu. The object of such landings has been to cause a diversion, so as to enable the Japanese to cross the river. Takushan is not a good strategic point. The road leading therefrom is bad, and troops could only be supplied with great difficulty.

"The Russians will not show their hand at this stage, but will continually harass the enemy, choosing their own time for a battle."

COALING THE FLEET.

How Supplies at Port Arthur Will Be Replenished.

London cable says—The Daily Mail lengthily details the proposed Russian scheme of coaling the Baltic fleet on its voyage to the Far East. Large vessels chartered from one of the Atlantic lines will, according to the Mail, be employed for this purpose in the Mediterranean. With the view of replenishing the coal supply at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, the Russian agent in London has chartered about 20 steamers, British, German and American, which will convey 70,000 tons of coal, nominally for a German firm, to a Chinese neutral port, whence they will dash for Port Arthur and Vladivostok. The freight rate, according to the paper, is nearly £3 per ton.

JAPS IN PURSUIT.

Strong Squadron of Cruisers en Route for Sea of Japan.

Kobe cable says—Under full steam a strong squadron of Japanese armoured cruisers was observed this morning making its way northward in the Japan Sea. It is believed that the vessels are on their way to attempt to cut off the Russian squadron that appeared at Gensan, on the east coast of Corea, yesterday. It is feared, however, that as the Russian cruisers are superior in speed to those of the Mikado, they may escape in safety to the shelter of Vladivostok.

It is also stated that the Japanese have succeeded in luring the Russians from protection of the Vladivostok guns, and that there is another Japanese squadron between them and their retreat, but these are mere rumors.

A London cable says—Nothing can be learned of the strength of the Japanese who are reported to have crossed the Yalu River, or the exact position there. According to current statements, the Russians do not intend to seriously oppose their passage, either because they do not believe that the movement is serious, thinking it is merely a feint, or because they hope to lure the invaders into the open country in Southern Manchuria. The St. Petersburg correspondent of the Express quoted a high official of the general staff as saying: "We do not attach great importance to the reported activity of the Japanese on the Yalu. We cannot see what they would gain by attempting to force the river. We are very strongly posted on the north bank. We have the best position, and hold the country in great strength thence to Liao-Yang and Mukden. We believe the enemy to be too circum-petent to try an extensive campaign from the Yalu. We are not deceived as to their methods. We know what value to attach to their alleged bridging. Anyhow, such movements would not be seriously opposed. Ours is essentially the waiting game. It would be unwise to act until the Japanese have shown their hand. We do not be-

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by the middle of May, and there is no sign that these limits will be exceeded.

Russian Transport Weak.

It will always be possible to bring up more men, if all the horses, wagons and equipments which are concomitants of a mobile force are omitted, but it is useless for Russian purposes to amass a horde of infantry in Manchuria without transport, and tied to the railway. Then, as things stand, we are without information to the mobility of the Russian field army, and some acute observers on the continent declare that not half the necessary number of wagons and animals were assembled when hostilities began for use of the troops in East Asia.

Kouropatkin Tied Down.

"In view of all these considerations, it is a somewhat large assumption to hold that the Russian army is double the strength of the Japanese." The correspondent says that General Kouropatkin, under his own hand, certainly has not more than 80,000 men, and these are spread over a large territory. "The only reason," says the correspondent, "that General Kouropatkin has not delivered a vigorous counter attack against the first Japanese army is that he has not the necessary force to act offensively, and cannot let go his hold on one point or another until the objective of the enemy becomes patent.

"The initiative is still with the Japanese. It is impracticable for the Russian commander, with any regard to prudence, to commit himself to advance in force into Corea while in the dark as to the main line of attack of the enemy. Gen. Kouropatkin is tied by the fog of disperses and the direction of the main force becomes apparent."

Alexieff's Humiliation.

The correspondent, discussing the reported resignation of Viceroy Alexieff, says it is probable the Viceroy offered to resign, but failed to receive the imperial permission. The correspondent goes on to say: "The Viceroy, who has served with such a florid flourish of trumpets some nine months ago, has been recently shorn of the chief part of his powers, and has lost the command of both the army and the fleet. The civil administration is still in his hands, but now that a state of war exists, and the entire country is practically foreign territory in Russian military occupation, the sphere of the civil administrator escapes accurate delimitation. If the Viceroy is not on a best terms with the general commanding the army in Manchuria, and if he is altogether hostile to Admiral Skrydloff, we can sympathize with his desire to terminate an almost intolerable position. On the other hand, the Viceroy probably feels that there is a slight of vacillation if his lieutenant were recalled in the hour of stress and such an open acknowledgment of the failure of the whole policy underlying the case of last July would injuriously affect the prestige of Russia and throw a stronger light upon the misfortunes of the first weeks of the war. In view of the predominance assumed by the land operations, the secondary role devolving upon the shattered squadron and the altogether subordinate functions of civil administration, it would be difficult to deny that the concentration of all the powers in the hands of the general commanding would be the natural course dictated by the situation.

The alternative is the departure of the Viceroy for the seat of war, to which rumor continually recurs. Russian Czars have generally accompanied their armies in the field, and their presence has often proved a great advantage. During the war with Turkey in 1877-78 the Russian Czar crossed the Danube with his army, and was accompanied by the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who has left an interesting account of the events of that time. The mobilization of the Czar in 1878-79 was a great success in the event of another imperial progress to the seat of war is not, perhaps, to be anticipated, and would cause some consternation in that amiable circle, but it is not altogether impossible that the chiefs of the two States now at war might encourage their armies in operation by their presence at the post of danger."

IN HIS OWN BLOOD.

Jap Then Got Leave to Risk Life for his Country.

A letter has been received at the Methodist Mission Rooms from Rev. R. C. Armstrong, a missionary in Shidzuoka, Japan, in which he speaks of the effect of the war on religious work. He writes: "History repeats itself in that nations in trouble seek Almighty help, and so the prayer service is better attended. To show the influence of war on the religious life, let me give an illustration. The other night I was reading my own class, when I met about fifty young men. They were dressed in something resembling white bathing suits; each one carried a Japanese lantern and a small sheep bell. The first one had a branch of evergreen. They ran in single file, and as they ran they sang 'Rokkon-she-go.' I learned they were going to the temples and shrines praying for the success of the soldiers. They dressed in pilgrim outfits in order to receive favor from the gods. The green branch was symbolic of life, and the words mean 'May our six senses be pure,' or otherwise the gods will not hear their prayer. I have seen this several times, but lately they have forbidden such superstitious practices, and so it has ceased. In another part of the letter Rev. Mr. Armstrong writes of the spirit with which the Japanese have entered into the great struggle.

"The Japanese can teach some lessons in patriotism," he writes. "When volunteers were desired to block Port Arthur, many applied who could not go. One of these was so disappointed at the refusal that he cut his finger, wrote an application in his own blood, and again sent it in, and was accepted. Even the school children are filled with the spirit. In a certain city one boy was reported to have been killed because he took the part of Russia in a school contest, representing Japan and Russia, and yet thought these things indicate deep feeling and loyalty, there is very little of the jingo spirit; it is more hidden and less demonstrative."

The Building Trades' council is getting settled in its new headquarters in the Hilsendegen block to-day. The bricklayers who have been meeting out in and was accepted. Even the school children are filled with the spirit. In a certain city one boy was reported to have been killed because he took the part of Russia in a school contest, representing Japan and Russia, and yet thought these things indicate deep feeling and loyalty, there is very little of the jingo spirit; it is more hidden and less demonstrative."

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