

the points taken on the Canadian side. The editor concludes as follows: "The facts as set forth by the Canadian papers and journals above named seem to lend colour to these charges. So far as the accusation affects Lord Alverstone and the British government, it is a matter personal to them. But so far as it affects the honour of our commissioners and our government, it is personal to every American citizen. If the foregoing charges are based upon facts, which we are not in a position to decide, they deprive us of that moral support which we have a right to demand that our rulers furnish in matters so grave. Are these charges against our commissioners true? If not, their falsity should be easily proved. If true, they utterly disqualified them to act, since 'no man should be a judge in his own cause, and no man should be allowed to be a juror in any case who has treated of the matter in dispute or who has declared his opinion in the matter beforehand.' The award of the Boundary Tribunal may be final in the sense that there is no appeal to a higher tribunal. But if our Canadian neighbours feel that they have been wronged, no other court of appeal than our honour should be needed. Canada can afford to lose what she has lost far better than we can afford to keep what we have gained, if gained unfairly and at the expense of national honour. An award that does not bear upon its face the indicia of absolute fairness would not be accepted as final by an honourable contestant, and an honourable nation should indignantly refuse to accept the fruits of such."

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In a recent case of *Fitzgerald v. Wallace*, 6 O.L.R. 634, an application to the Master in Chambers at Osgoode Hall for increased security for costs in a case pending in the Court of Appeal was dismissed because of a supposed want of jurisdiction to hear the motion. It would have been more satisfactory if the learned Master had in disposing of the case considered the effect of sec. 131 of the Judicature Act from which it appears that the Master in Chambers is an officer of the Supreme Court, and as such he is as much an officer of the Court of Appeal as of the High Court. Rule 42 which defines his jurisdiction however serves to limit it to cases pending in the High Court, and it may perhaps be worth the consideration of the judges whether a jurisdiction in Chambers in matters pending in the Court of Appeal should not