

Interim Supply

with particular reference to the expenditure of money. We are being asked to vote expenditures of money now on some aspects of that defence policy which, in our view, make no sense whatever, especially in the light of the information we have received in the last day or two from Washington concerning the Bomarc missile, and not only the Bomarc missile but the whole system of continental defence which is under review and re-examination in Washington at the present time. In the light of what has happened to this particular missile, and in the light of this re-examination which is taking place in Washington of the bases of our continental defence system, to which we are attached, it seems to us, Mr. Chairman, to be the height of folly to go ahead with expenditures of this kind.

In so far as the Bomarc is concerned, surely a single dollar now being spent on Bomarc facilities and Bomarc bases is, to say the least, in very great danger of being wasted, especially, Mr. Chairman, when the government cannot make up its mind as to what kind of weapon this Bomarc would be if it were successful technically. The Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Prime Minister have recently thrown some doubt on the advisability, which some of us share, of using nuclear warheads in this particular weapon if it should in fact be technically successful, and there is no evidence to that effect. But the Minister of National Defence has been quite specific and categorical on this subject. He has not retreated one inch, so far as I know, from the position which he announced on March 10, 1959, when he said, as reported at page 1776 of *Hansard*:

Both the Prime Minister and myself have on several occasions stated that there will be two squadrons of Bomarc... These will be separate units with complete establishments of personnel, missiles and launching apparatus.

He made clear, as the Prime Minister made clear at that time and on other occasions, that those two complete squadrons would not achieve their maximum effectiveness unless they had nuclear warheads. However, there is no indication, even from the minister's statement this morning in answer to a question, that the government's confidence in this missile, which confidence has been pretty well abandoned in the country where it is being made, is shaken in any respect. This is just one example of wasteful expenditures of money on national defence policy.

Another example, perhaps, is the Lacrosse missile. On October 1, 1958 the Prime Minister announced that we would establish a battery of Lacrosse missiles at initial cost for equipment of \$1,198,000. It was stated by the minister in the house on July 3, 1959

[Mr. Pearson.]

that there would be an item in the estimates for that purpose. The minister said, as reported at page 5443 of *Hansard*:

There is money provided in the estimates for the initial procurement of this Lacrosse weapon.

We were told on February 22, 1960, as reported at page 1296 of *Hansard*, by the minister, who had said the year before that there was going to be an item in the estimates:

... we are not at the present time in a position to make any firm recommendations or place a firm order.

He was referring to this particular missile. This is the kind of thing which surely gives us the right to make this kind of motion of no confidence in the spending policy of this government in matters of defence.

What is the relationship of this uncertainty, to say the least, to the whole question of continental defence? The Bomarc is likely to be a failure; the CF-105 has been scrapped. We now have our continental defence, in so far as there is any defence of any kind, through interceptors composed of squadrons of CF-100's, squadrons of CF-100's which could not possibly be effective against the latest potential manned bomber let alone missiles for which they were not designed to be effective, squadrons of CF-100's which the minister himself said on May 28, 1957 were obsolete. On that occasion he was reported in the *Victoria Times* of May 28, 1957 as saying:

Millions of dollars have been spent developing and producing the CF-100 jet fighter, which now are obsolete and unsaleable.

They are the planes which are now the only equipment we have in respect of continental defence. Presumably in these particular estimates which we are now being asked to vote, there will be some money for the maintenance and upkeep of the CF-100's in our continental defence squadrons.

There is something even more surprising than the incidents I have mentioned in regard to defence policy and which gives us even better cause to question the advisability of spending money of this kind on this kind of policy. The Acting Secretary of State said in this house on March 11, 1960, page 1972 of *Hansard*:

Mr. Speaker, I did not consult my colleague, but I still say that our \$281 million contribution to the Colombo plan has done much more for world peace than the billions which we have had to spend on defence.

We are being asked to spend more millions on defence which, according to the Acting Secretary of State, are not as effective for defence as are the expenditures on the Colombo plan. When we questioned the Minister