treaty and whose application for discharge on a writ of Habeas Corpus *a l subjiciendum* has been refused, may appeal to the Supreme Court against the affirmation of such conviction or the refusal of such application, and the said Court shall make such rule or order therein, either in affirmance of the conviction, or for granting a new trial, or otherwise, as the justice of the case requires, and shall make all other necessary rules and orders for carrying such rule or order into effect, anything in the eightieth section of the Act. passed in the Session held in the thirty-second and thirty-third years of HER MAJESTY'S Reign, chapter twenty-nine, to the contrary, notwithstanding: Provided that no such Appeal shall be allowed where the Court affirming the conviction is unanimous, nor unless notice of Appeal in writing has been served on the Attorney General for the proper Province, within *fifteen* days after such affirmance or refusal."

He believed that this provision would be acceptable to the whole House. It was also desirable that some means should exist of setting right questions of law arising out of the execution of treaties with foreign countries. As would be seen from the 53rd clause of the Bill, the judgment of the Supreme Court, in all cases, would be final and conclusive. Hon. members would observe that on the question of appeal to the Privy Council, he had thought it better to make no provision in the Bill. Parties desiring to avail themselves of the right could address HER MAJESTY'S Privy Council by petition, and have their cases heard. He had omitted alluding to the subject purposely, because, while he did not desire to put any unnecessary obstacle in the way of exercising the right of petition, he wished to see the practice put an end to altogether. In view of the law recently passed in England, which was intended to have come into effect on the 1st November, 1874, but the operation of which had been postponed up to 1st November next, establishing a Supreme Court of Judicature, he thought the realization of his desire in respect to this matter was likely to be fulfilled. Under this law the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would be transferred to the Supreme Court of Judicature sitting in London. He did not think the right of appeal would not then be prized so much as it was now, because the new court in London would be a court of law, and not as the Privy Council is, a court of prerogative. He would like very well to see a clause introduced declaring that this right of appeal to the Privy Council existed no longer. There were very strong reasons in favour of the right of appeal to the Privy Council, but the reasons against it were still stronger. The right of appeal had been rather extensively used, and he might add, considerably abused in the Province of Quebec, by wealthy men and wealthy corporations to force suiters to compromise in cases in which they had succeeded in all the tribunals of the country. However, as he had already said, he had made no mention of the matter in the bill now before the House, but left it to be disposed at some future time. Clause 54 gave the Judges of the proposed Supreme Court jurisdiction in *habeas corpus* concurrently with the Judges of the several Provinces. In that portion of the bill referring to constitutional matters, he had preserved two of the clauses of the measure introduced by the right hon. member for Kingston. The first clause in reference to this subject—clause 55—provided that the Governor-in-Council might direct a special case to be laid before the Court for its opinion. Clause 56 gave the right to any Province, or any other interested party, thought fit to appear before the Court and be heard in any such case, but the decision rendered by the Court would not bear the character of a judgment, it would merely have its moral weight in assisting the Government to arrive at a determination. Clause 57 extended this reference to the other cases at the pleasure of the Governor-in-Council. As to the portion of the Bill relating to special jurisdiction, it was framed in order to satisfy a very generally expressed public desire that there should be some court which would settle the extent of the powers of Local Legislatures when these powers were in dispute. No one doubted, however, that under the constitution it was not in the power of this Parliament to give jurisdiction to such a court to try constitutional questions. As a matter of fact, the only power which could be conferred upon the court properly was to try appeals from the decisions of courts of original jurisdiction. A Justice of the Peace had as good a right, according to the constitution, to try constitutional questions as would the Judges of the highest existing courts, but it was obviously proper nevertheless that the trial of such cases should be in the hands of the highest tribunal in the land. Acknowledging his