

- e) financial responsibility for the use of armed forces in aid of civilian police forces
- f) the need for amendments to require an Attorney-General of a Province to establish reasonable grounds for use of the force
- g) the need for a requirement of consultation with federal political authorities (Parliament or the Cabinet) before Armed Forces can be used in this manner
- h) the need for an express requirement that the Chief of Defence Staff consult with federal political authorities before sending troops and before deciding size and nature of force
- i) the need for Parliamentary review at one or more or all stages of this crucial decision-making process
- j) the need for a federal role in deciding when military aid is no longer required
- k) the timing and contents of any report from the Province concerned
- l) whether the Department of the Secretary of State is the most appropriate destination for report(s) from the Province concerned (e.g. the federal Minister of Justice may be more appropriate)
- m) whether the Act should allow the federal government to seek more details in formal reporting from a Province
- n) whether there should be Parliamentary review and approval of expenditures for this purpose
- o) whether there should be provision to ensure some independent human rights body has jurisdiction to hear and deal with complaints of human rights violations made against the Armed Forces
- p) the ability of the Armed Forces to deal with conflicts involving native rights and whether Armed Forces personnel receive proper training in race relations

With respect to the negotiation process that followed July 11, each party demonstrated great tenacity in maintaining entrenched positions: statements and proposals were redrafted throughout the summer to say essentially the same things, with the exception of the Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy in its role as an intermediary. In fact, the main actors frequently pointed out with some pride that their positions had not changed from the beginning of the crisis.

There was in the end, a head on collision between competing assertions of sovereignty. This is most clearly demonstrated by the unqualified sovereignty position of the Longhouse People of The Pines, and the fact that the contract of one of the federal negotiators specifically required that negotiations would be conducted on the basis of domestic policy rather than recognition of Mohawk sovereignty in the international sense.