

affairs. I wish, however, to mention certain general principles which I think have emerged as a result of events in these three areas. They are principles which may guide us in determining the way in which the United Nations can function in existing circumstances.

In the first place, it has been demonstrated by experience that no agency of the United Nations should embark upon a course of action unless there is a reasonable chance that its recommendations or decisions can and will be put into effect. A national government can make decisions, knowing that it has instruments at its command by which, within its own borders at least, it can make sure that its will is observed. Even a national government, however, has to calculate whether there is likely to be a sufficient degree of support amongst its people to ensure the success of its policies, and it must be certain also that this support will be given such practical expression as the payment of taxes, the observance of regulations, or the performance of services on the part of individuals. The same considerations apply in the case of the United Nations. It is, however, much more difficult for the United Nations to make the necessary calculations either of its own strength or of the possibility that its decisions will be accepted by the parties concerned.

There are a number of examples that I could give of this principle, but I refer to only one of them --- the action of the Security Council in relation to Palestine. The resolution of the General Assembly in 1947 in regard to Palestine made certain recommendations for the future of that area, and in general terms it gave the Security Council responsibility for supervising the process by which a settlement was reached. The present position in Palestine does not correspond in detail to the General Assembly resolution, and many adjustments have had to be made in that recommendation. The general principles of the settlement, however, are those which the Assembly recommended. The process of adjustment was unfortunately interrupted by sharp and intermittent bursts of warfare, and the Security Council has been called upon to deal with the problem thus created. There have been frequent demands that the Security Council should intervene with force, and that it should suppress the fighting. There might have been a good deal to recommend such a course of action if it could have been carried out firmly and quickly. The question had to be asked, however, what force was going to be used, and how it was going to impose its will. The effect of this question -- and the Canadian delegation on the Security Council has been one of those which most frequently asked it -- has been to force the Security Council to formulate its decisions within the limits of what it could accomplish. In general, therefore, it has simply called upon the parties to stop fighting, without prejudice to the final settlement, and then offered them the means by which they can work out that settlement by negotiation rather than by conflict, with the United Nations using its influence as a third party to moderate the dispute.

The second principle which has emerged in connection with the events to which I have referred is that, to the greatest extent possible, responsibility for the solution of a political problem should be left primarily with the people who are immediately affected by it. It is sometimes tempting to think that an international organization should simply move in on an area, suppress disturbances, and decide upon the terms of a settlement. This is a temptation to which the United Nations could not in present circumstances very well succumb. The effect of adopting such a course would be greatly to reduce the extent to which the results achieved corresponded to the realities of the situation. Let us take Kashmir as an example. The major question is who shall control this territory, and it is complicated by the problem of fighting which has already taken place, and the constant menace of communal warfare.