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CANADA'S VIETNAM POLICY

The following is the text of an address by Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the University of Windsor on February 3:

In Vietnam, the conflict continues with no sign of abatement. In the face of this situation, the concerns and anxieties of public opinion in Canada, no less than in other countries of the world, are understandable, and they are fully shared by the Canadian Government.

From a very early stage in the evolution of the present situation in Vietnam, we have held to the view that, however valid the basic purposes of United States' policy may be, a military solution to this problem is neither practicable nor desirable. Only a political settlement arrived at through some form of negotiations can bring a lasting and equitable peace to an area which has known only instability, violence and open warfare for a quarter of a century.

Common sense and humanity demand that the present conflict be brought to an end. Can the means be found for doing so? Has Canada anything to contribute to the search for a peaceful settlement of this conflict and an honourable alternative to the present clash of arms?

I believe that we have, and this is the task we set for ourselves some time ago, in full awareness of the complexities of the problem and its historical roots, and the probable frustrations which would be encountered. There are few — if any — international problems in which Canada has an interest which have engaged so much of our time and so much of our energies and efforts.

It might be argued that the results have been minimal. I would be the first to agree. But I refuse to accept that as either a reason to give up the

effort, or as an excuse for jettisoning patience and quiet diplomacy in favour of public appeals or denunciation.

I think there is a valid distinction to be drawn between individual personal reactions, and the possibilities open to a government for constructive political action. Although the goals of both may be the same, the techniques involved are quite different.

There are those who urge us to "speak out against" this or that aspect of the war, or to "demand a cessation" of something else. I would not question for a moment the sincerity or the sense of urgency which lies behind these demands. But I would ask the advocates of political activism to pause for a moment to reflect on the practical consequences of their proposals. Do they believe that if a government — and I really mean the Canadian Government — made a series of strong public declarations the basis of its Vietnam policy, the tangled and dangerous problem in that country would begin to unravel itself?

STEPS TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

To be more specific, let us look at the question of the bombing of North Vietnam. I am convinced that this is one of the key elements, if not the key element, in the present military diplomatic puzzle. But it is clearly not the only one — there are other actions and other responsibilities which must also be fitted into the total pattern of steps towards a peaceful settlement. And until at least some faint outline of a pattern can be established through quiet diplomacy, it seems unlikely that the bombing would stop, simply in response to a Canadian Government demand or appeal that it stop, regardless of what