

- inadequate training for monitors, particularly in that training has focused too much on legal formalities and too little on practical realities and the special problems facing women;
- UN bureaucratic procedures that include poor recruitment practices, counterproductive work rules and hand-to-mouth financial arrangements;
- an absence of intra-UN cooperation, ranging from poor New York back-up for human rights divisions of peace-keeping operations;
- delays in launching HRMMs, leading to loss of mission credibility and significant cuts in the effective operating durations of missions;
- constraints regarding availability of funds to assess needs and plan missions;
- the absence of institutional memory and a coordinating body for HRMMs, contributing to a failure to learn lessons and improve procedures from one mission to the next;
- the quality of mission leadership, which has not been a problem in most instances, but which remains a crucial consideration to bear in mind;
- the selection and nature of monitors, which has been mixed and which needs to rely more on practical country experience, activist human rights backgrounds and specialized skills (such as forensics) and less on academic legal training;
- rapid staff turnover among United Nations Volunteers acting as monitors;
- the selection and nature of police and military members of HRMMs by their home governments, which leads to some lacking appropriate orientation and skills;
- the lack of human rights training for peace-keeping personnel who are not HRMs; and
- inadequate debriefing procedures for monitors at the close of their service.²

His observations are correct, and he also points out some inherent limitations for HROs regardless of how well they are fielded. However, Golub feels there is substantial potential for HROs in the long run and sets out a number of options for USAID to help in strengthening future HROs. This study is even more optimistic about the potential for HROs, and the ability of the UN and committed individuals to build upon the successes of these early prototypical HROs. This study is equally optimistic about the ability of the UN and individuals to overcome the failures of past HROs. However, before proceeding to look at repeating successes and suggesting options for overcoming failures, it is important to more fully establish the basis for HROs in the first place.

Until recently and perhaps even now, most individuals did not subscribe to the importance of human rights. Certainly most do not readily agree with this study's position that there is an absolute need to deal with human rights in UN field operations if there are to be any durable solutions, particularly for complex emergencies. Therefore, the first part of the study will set out the rationale or *why* human rights should be a part of UN field operations, before moving to *what* it means in operational terms.

² Stephen Golub, *Strengthening Human Rights Monitoring Missions: an options paper prepared for the Office of Transition Initiatives Bureau for Humanitarian Response, USAID, December 1995.*