

artillery, warships displacing over 850 tons, and missiles with ranges exceeding 25 km. Surface-to-Air missiles are not included. Initially, reports are to be filed on imports and exports. However, states are also invited to report on their own military holdings, national procurement, and relevant policies. The resolution established a Group of Governmental Experts to outline the details of the arms register.

The United Nations placed an arms embargo on South Africa in 1962, and on Yugoslavia in 1991. One of the main functions of the UN Coalition forces in the Persian Gulf has been to stop and search ships with cargoes bound for Iraq. The inspections of Iraqi installations carried out after the end of active hostilities have revealed the great quantity of armaments that had been imported, including both technology and finished weapons, over a period of years and in spite of export controls and arms control treaties such as the NPT. In 1992 an embargo on transfer of weapons to Yugoslavia is supported by monitoring of merchant ship traffic in the Adriatic by joint naval forces of NATO and the Western European Union.

A by-product of CFE will be to accelerate the form of arms transfer known as "cascading" or "trickle-down", in which equipment that has been in service for some years with a large modern force becomes surplus, perhaps because it is being replaced by more modern versions, or perhaps because compliance with an agreement requires reductions. Instead of destroying the surplus equipment it may be sold or given to another less well-equipped country, for whose forces it will represent an improvement.

As more nations acquire the industrial capability to manufacture advanced weapons, the power of groups such as the "permanent five", MTCR, or CoCom to influence non-members by threatening to withhold critical components will be weakened.

For the most part these various activities to establish some form of transparency and control over the international transfer of arms lack arrangements for verification, enforcement, or sanctions. However, the combination of information from the many other arms control activities, including confidence-building, transparency measures, and data exchanges, as well as monitoring by NTM (including commercial intelligence) and aerial and on-site inspection, offer the opportunity to exploit synergy, as long as the flow of data and the applications of analysis are fused together, rather than being compartmented by separate national and bureaucratic agencies. One problem will be to persuade governments to verify activities inside their own country, including the supply of armament by multinational corporations.

