chological dimension of CBMs in much of his work, relating it to a primary CBM concern – reducing concerns about surprise attack:

"One of the basic objectives of CBMs is to eliminate the possibility of surprise attack. CBMs are designed to ensure the correct interpretation of an adversary's intentions in order to reduce the danger arising from unfounded suspicions and misperceptions which are often the result of prejudice or misjudgement.

Viewed in the CSCE context, the essence of CBMs is to demonstrate a willingness to respect the security interests of others and adopt a cooperative rather than aggressive stance ... [and] contribute to breaking down stereotypes, transforming the image of "the enemy" to one of a more "cooperating partner". By eliminating accidents and the dangers of misinformation – thereby providing predictability and stability – CBMs would further the rationalization of international relations.

In short, CBMs are primarily intended to alter perceptions, so that the intentions of states can be seen for what they actually are, rather than for what they are imagined to be. They are measures chiefly of a political and psychological nature even though they pertain to the domain of military activity."³¹

Writing elsewhere, Rotfeld states that:

"the intrinsic object of CBMs is the correct interpretation of the intentions of partners in the system of international relations. ...

[T]he aim was to eliminate subjective factors and evaluations which are often due to prejudice and faulty understanding. ...

[T]he operation of CBMs boils down to eliminating the chance and dangers arising from inaccurate information as well as to removing the causes of rivalry in the development of military capabilities that spring from a sense of insecurity. ...

Lynn Hansen takes a slightly more restrictive approach to explaining what a CSBM is. (Incidentally, he and Rotfeld use the terms CBM and CSBM in a virtually interchangeable fashion.) He states that:

"CSBM must involve the transmission and verification of credible evidence that military forces and their activities do not constitute a threat to the security, sovereignty or political stability of any state.

If states would undertake reciprocal and cooperative measures that would lessen the opportunity to utilize military force as an instrument of aggressive political objectives, one could begin to speak of the kind of confidence-building that would be conducive to real arms reductions. Such measures require some concrete action commensurate with the dimensions of the political-military problem."³³

Hansen, writing in another article, is critical of an undue fascination with the psychological character of CBMs. He claims that:

"a number of analysts who have attempted to address the question of the conceptual underpinnings of confidence building have begun with the psychological phenomena of what constitutes trust. But this is approaching the problem backwards. Confidence building in Europe cannot aim at creating a warm and fuzzy feeling to fulfill a psychological need. In the first instance, confidence is (and always will be) directly related to the condition of one's own security. The path to confidence building most frequently chosen by states is the unilateral



Thus the object of CBMs is to alter perspectives and ensure the perception of partner's aims in a more or less correct rather than imaginary light."³²

Adam Rotfeld, "CBMs Between Helsinki and Madrid: Theory and Experience," in Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds), Confidence-Building Measures in Europe (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983), pp. 93-94.

Adam Rotfeld, "European Security and Confidence Building: Basic Aims," in Karl E. Birnbaum (ed.) Confidence Building in East-West Relations (Laxenburg, Austria: Austrian Institute for International Affairs – Wilhelm Braumuller, 1982), pp. 106-107.

³³ Lynn Hansen, "Confidence and Security Building at Madrid and Beyond," in Larrabee and Stobbe, Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, p. 145,