

The general order, it will be noticed, is drawn with much skill. There is no direct attempt to take away the credit from the actual commander of the day. In fact, there is explicit recognition of that officer's "judicious" conduct "in the choice of his position and the disposition of his troops." On the other hand, the indirect effect of the whole document is to belittle the part played by De Salaberry. General De Watteville is credited with a prominent part in the success of the action, when, as a matter of fact, he did not come up till it was over; he had, however, previously reviewed De Salaberry's positions and approved them. Further, De Salaberry is spoken of as merely acting as cover to working parties; when, as a matter of fact, he planned the arrangement for the whole action. And finally, Prevost insinuates, though he does not state, that he had a part in the conduct of the battle, when he was really some fifteen miles distant from the field.

The prominence given by the Governor-General to De Watteville seems to have been a bid for his assistance in robbing De Salaberry of his due. This temptation seems to have been held out to the brigade commander quite without his suggestion, if we are to accept the evidence of the report which he sent to Prevost and the brigade order which was issued by Major Burke under his direction. Both these accounts of the battle give all the praise for the conduct of the action and the choice of the positions to De Salaberry. This is sufficiently clear from the report to the Commander-in-chief, which is as follows:

"Ferme Morrison, 27th October, 1813.

"Sir,—I am permitted to send Your Excellency a report received last night from Lieutenant-Colonel De Salaberry, commanding the most advanced posts and the pickets on the River Chateaugay, relating the circumstances of an attack made by the enemy yesterday afternoon against the posts placed by his orders. Your Excellency will permit me to observe that Lieutenant-Colonel De Salaberry has

done himself much honour and deserves my warmest recommendation for the judgment and activity which he displayed in choosing his ground, which he fortified shortly afterwards, and which, combined with the general good behavior of his troops, prevented the enemy from succeeding in the first movement against our advance posts on the Chateaugay."

This generous report by De Watteville, which he sent to Prevost as a cover to De Salaberry's account of the action, puts us in a position to understand the deep indignation which must have raged within De Salaberry's breast as he read the general order published on the day succeeding the battle. By the time he came to write to his father, almost a week later, his bitterness had subsided so as to enable him to write with comparative calmness. This calmness was probably due in part to the fact that he had already unburdened himself in two official protests against the order. One of these he had sent to Adjutant-General Baynes, who signed the order, and the other to the Prince Regent. The tenor of these official documents may be gathered from the copy of the former which he enclosed, with the letter already quoted, to his father. It is clearly the work of a man smarting under unjust treatment. It runs literally as follows:

"Advance Posts, 1st Nov., 1813.

"Sir,—Referring to the general order of the 27th ult., issued in consequence of the action in which I repulsed General Hampton's army, I observe with regret that the choice of the several positions which I defended is not attributed to me, neither is the disposition of the force which was immediately under my command understood to have been altogether mine, from which the greater part of the merit (if any there was in contending against a whole army for the space of four hours) is taken away from me.

"To elucidate this it appears necessary I should state that when it was reported on the 21st ult. at Chateaugay Church at night, the enemy had surprised the piquet at Piper's Road, I was desired to move with my corps to English River, and finding when there that the enemy's intention appeared to be to move down the River Chateaugay on the way to Mont-