

you mean by this, is that no efforts which the man can put forth would result in breaking his chains. Granted. But what has that to do with the matter? You are merely asserting that certain external consequences would not follow from the man's actings. But the question of freedom, at least the only one worth discussing, is not, what consequences we are led by experience to believe would follow certain actions, but whether the subjective energies, which constitute our actions, are the unconstrained forth-puttings of a power inherent in Self; in other words, whether men are veritable, and not mere nominal agents.

It is on the miserable view of freedom, which considers it as having reference to the results of action, rather than as lying in the reality of the power of acting, that Locke, with whose statements on this point, the remarks of Edwards very closely coincide, proceeds in determining how far human freedom reaches. How far human freedom reaches! Are we not free, if free at all, in every action we perform? But let us hear Locke. Liberty, he tells us, is "the power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other." And from this conception of liberty he draws the conclusion that we are free, as far as we can produce results, but no farther. Thus, I am free to throw a quoit twenty yards, but not to throw it two hundred. Or, to give an illustration in Locke's own words: "A man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For, though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling, yet, the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition, and therefore he is not free." It seems to me that the more correct account of such a case would be, that "herein" the man does not act at all, either freely or necessarily. The general statement, that liberty is the power which we have to do or to forbear any particular action, according to the preference of the mind, I could accept, if it meant no more than this, that we are free, inasmuch as we are veritable agents. But this is not Locke's meaning. He unambiguously uses the word action to denote, not the subjective energy which the living being exerts, but the result in which that energy issues. Of course, if any one chooses to