

We have, it must be admitted, gained many useful lessons in the art of how not to do it, and amongst the most useful is one which relates to what is called "the general idea." Some theory must, of course, be accepted by both the contending parties, but it ought not to extend beyond the object of the campaign and the circumstances under which the operations are commenced. When the general idea is at all expanded, it at once loses its true character, and the campaign becomes little more than a string of large field-days. Our arrangements are in this respect extremely open to censure. So many instructions were issued by the Headquarters Staff, so much was assumed, so frequently were events pre-arranged, that the generals had but little opportunity of showing any strategic talent. Again, the forces were so unequally divided that the tactical contests were unsatisfactory and unprofitable to the last degree. In real war 10,000 men often beat 20,000, but then the superior qualities of the smaller body and the moral effect of the blows dealt by it counterbalance the arithmetical inferiority. In a sham campaign, however, the troops are assumed to be of equal excellence, and moral effect is altogether eliminated; unless, therefore, there would be wonderful incapacity on the part of the general of the larger army, the latter cannot fail to defeat one of half its own strength. We may here observe that it is because of the elimination of the moral element from a peace campaign that we can never accept the training of the latter but as a very imperfect substitute for the education of real war. If battles were like games of chess, and soldiers were made of boxwood or ivory, then the test and training of peace manoeuvres would suffice. As it is, there must be much of what children call "make believe," accompanied by not unfrequent absurdities due to an over-liberal indulgence in imagination. Yet it is difficult to steer clear of these absurdities. A general officer removing his plume and gravely crawling forward to the edge of a bank for the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy is a grotesque sight, yet without such precautions he would in war be inevitably picked off. It is clearly necessary, therefore, that on these occasions everybody should exert his imaginative powers to the utmost; but unluckily the results of the imaginative faculty are not uniformly identical—nay, they are frequently contradictory. The cavalry in the last battle were convinced that they had sabred every Highland skirmisher in their front; no doubt the Highlanders were as strongly convinced that they had shot down every dragoon who had charged them, and the actual result would have depended more upon the moral than the material circumstances of the contest. Umpires cannot weigh the morale of troops. Leaving this subject, we regret that not only were matters too much pre-arranged, but that in most cases the troops were allowed to glean no lessons from the manoeuvres in which they had taken what must often have appeared to them a meaningless part. That they felt the greatest interest in the operations was evidenced by the eagerness with which newspaper accounts were devoured. This interest might have been turned to profit had the remarks of the Duke of Cambridge on the manoeuvres performed been daily published to the army. Another defect in the arrangements, and one which militated much against the realism of the affair, was that the Control Departments of the two hostile armies made use of Aldershot as their common base, thus arranging the conditions of their operations so that they should be as different

as possible from those of real war.

While on the subject of the Control, we may take the opportunity of urging the propriety of changing the title of this department. The term Control and the title Controller are most obnoxious to the Army, and tend in no slight degree to a misapprehension of both the position and duties of the department. "The Supply Department" would be a much more suitable and popular name. The Volunteers might also perhaps with great advantage adopt a new title, if a satisfactory one could be found. The name frequently affects the nature of a thing, and the word Volunteer has already to some extent come to be looked upon as the title of a man who does a little soldiering because he likes it, but need not do more than is agreeable to him. We do not mean to say that all, or many, Volunteers entertain this feeling; but we suspect that some do, and, at any rate, the name is misleading. The volunteering should cease from the moment when a man has assumed military duties, otherwise the ostensible addition to the force of the country, being uncertain and variable, may be rather an inconvenience than the contrary. By a natural connexion of ideas we pass from the Volunteers to the Militia. We have already remarked on the contingent sent by the latter force to Aldershot, and have now only to draw attention to the great necessity of some arrangements for distinguishing one Militia regiment from another. At present this is a matter of impossibility for a stranger without direct inquiry. It is easy to conceive how many dangerous mistakes, how much fatal delay, might be caused on service because a Staff officer was compelled to pull up his horse and put the question, "What regiment is that?"

It is not only the Militia who require that attention should be paid to their dress; we want in that respect a general reform throughout the whole army. To a true soldier's eye nothing which is not serviceable is really handsome, but there is no reason why the two may not be to a certain extent combined. A few removable ornaments in the shape of lace or epaulettes, would on the shortest notice convert a dress fit for the jungle into one suitable to a guard of honour, and a handsome uniform undoubtedly does exercise a wholesome influence over soldiers, and much facilitates recruiting. Still every thing must be made to give way to service considerations, and the soldier's uniform is simplified and loosened the better. To one conclusion we have come with regret. The bearskin caps of the Guards and Fusilier regiments, and the feather bonnets of the Highland corps, are very handsome, but are utterly unsuited to skirmishing. As therefore there will in future wars be a very great deal of that sort of work, it is to be hoped that some more convenient head-dress may be invented for these corps.

Among other reforms which we trust may result from our little campaign near Aldershot, is one in the manner of performing the duties of command. Some of our generals seem to think that if they are not perpetually rushing about they are doing nothing. They appear incapable of appreciating the nature and extent of their own duties, and are constantly encroaching on those of commanding officers. The consequences are to be seen in fussy, spasmodic operations, incapacity to modify manoeuvres and an absence of combined action. Save in emergencies, a general of brigade should direct only, leaving command to the colonels.

Our remarks on the autumn campaign are

now completed. We have certainly indulged in very frank speaking, and, having awarded blame more frequently than praise we have no doubt wounded many susceptibilities. Our view of the campaign, however, has been, that it was intended to test our Army, and to find out defects rather than excellences. If you test a cannon, you spare no trouble to ascertain if there is any flaw in the metal. You do not allow your attention to be diverted from faults of the bore by the strength and lightness of the carriage, or *vice versa*. In like manner we have deemed it our duty to confine our attention almost entirely to defects, because that which is perfect needs no further consideration, but faults and shortcomings may be remedied.

The naval strength of Russia as it was at the latest dates, not including the additions ordered during the present year, stood as follows: Cuirassiered turret ships, 21; frigates, 8; monitors, 10; corvettes and clippers, 32; gunboats, 68; steam-tugs, 12; other vessels 145—total, 296. To man these were—Admirals and holders of separate commands, 117; under officers, 3,035; seamen, 23,184; reserve, 14,194—total, 45,526. These vessels are all either in active service or can be made ready for sea in a short time.

The *Japan Times* says that in the interior of Japan there are to be found shops exclusively for the sale of the European goods, and that where few, if any, Europeans have visited or passed through. Soap, perfume, clocks, colored engravings, and beer seem to be in general demand, while some shops deal exclusively in tables and chairs after the European fashion. Gas will shortly be introduced in the principal commercial town of Japan—namely, Yokohama, and in part of the city of Yeddo, the seat of Mikado's government.

It is now re-affirmed—this time with much show of circumstantial proof—that President Grant still holds pertinaciously to that pet object of his, the annexation of San Domingo. His professed submission of the same to the will of the people is it seems but a cloak for a certain course of "masterly inactivity" through which he hopes to secure his ends by and by. Nor is he altogether inactive about it, after all, for he still keeps an American fleet in the Bay of Samana to overcome the Haytiens. It is just possible that Grant's tactics may succeed, the more so as neither Haytiens nor Dominicans have yet proved competent to the task of governing themselves.

The Russians appear to consider that by the conquest of Turkestan they have gained a second India, and to be earnestly bent upon improving the natural resources of the new province. The chief improvement on which they pin their hopes is extensive irrigation, by means of which they expect to raise large crops of silk and cotton. A project for irrigating the steppe of Drizack is at present under consideration, several engineers having been employed by Government in surveying the plain and working out a plan, which if approved will be put into operation at once.

DIED—At Berlin, Prussia, from the result of wounds received at the siege of Metz, COLONEL EDWIN VAN KAYSER, Prussian Horse Artillery, brother-in-law of Lieut. Colonel Robert Love-lace, late Osmanli Irregular Cavalry, and formerly Captain H.M. 19th Regiment; General Agent VOLUNTEER REVIEW, Provinces of Quebec and Ontario, Dominion of Canada.