

"that justly great attempt," "so promising an enterprise," and so forth. I have therefore applied the phrase "The Glorious Enterprise" X to the traditional plan itself. The issue was plainly put in such phrases as that of Caleb Heathcote, "it is impossible that we and the French can both inhabit this continent in peace," and "until the tryall is over and 'tis known whether North America must belong to the French or us."

Its essential features were (1) combined action by all the British colonies; (2) a fleet attacking Quebec; (3) an army making a supporting attack on Montreal by way of Lake Champlain; (4) the assistance of the Iroquois. As first conceived, it was indeed a bold and original design, aiming at the almost undreamt-of. And even towards the end it contrasted strongly in its comprehensive simplicity with the confused projects concerning the war in America among which the English military groped about. We know that the scheme failed in 1690. The determining cause then was the outbreak of smallpox among the Indians at the foot of Lake Champlain, which relieved Count Frontenac from the fear of an invasion of Montreal, and left him free to withstand the naval attack of Phips upon Quebec. In 1711, it failed again, through the cowardice and incompetence of Sir Hovenden Walker and General Hill in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The cause of its revival in the end was the utter failure of other plans of campaign, such as Shirley's against the Lake forts; Braddock's against the posts on the Ohio; and Abercromby's against Miconderoga. A great disaster was impending over the British colonies—their forces were exhausted, the Indian allies were on the eve of going over to the enemy, and the outlook was turning seriously in favour of a French future for America. Another generation of growth for the population of the New France, together with a rush of immigration from Old France into the West, and a people would have grown up firmly rooted in Canada like a nation of Europe, who might perhaps have been temporarily overrun, but whose permanent conquest would have been very doubtful. The "tryall" was still in the balance "whether North America must belong to the French or us," and was in danger of being finally decided not in favour of the British.

Two men, at least, knew what was needed in that critical hour. One was James de Lancey, Lieutenant-Governor of New York, who set forth in clear terms to the Lords of Trade the only means "to distress the French in Canada"; but, although he had some influence in England, he well knew that no colonial adviser was of sufficient weight to move fleets and armies by any direct action of his own, in the then state of mind towards provincials of the titled incompetents ruling at London. The other was De Lancey's friend, Thomas Pownall, Governor of Massachusetts and Lieutenant-Governor of New Jersey, brother of the

X The best engraved view of Louisbourg, ^{in 1758} bears an inscription ending with the words: "this Glorious Enterprise?"