

busy, as were those in France and in Great Britain and in the other Commonwealth nations. All were busy making plans. The Government here considered what they had to do, and they considered also how it should be done; but they did not make those plans all by themselves. They got into conference with their allies either here or in London or in Paris or somewhere else, and they sat around a table. They said, "Now, we must do this and we must do that;" and "Should we do this and should we do that?" For days and days they planned what they were going to do. A great deal of that planning had been done months before because war was staring them in the face. Nevertheless the time came when the Allied nations had to make their plans. They got together and formulated their plans, and those plans were set in motion.

The war went on, and we know what happened. Poland was overrun in a few days; Czechoslovakia was next; Austria at one stage was completely overrun. Then the German armies moved towards Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and all those countries fell. That undoubtedly necessitated a reconsideration of the Allied plans. Again there were meetings after meetings among the high-ranking military men of the Allied nations, and undoubtedly plans were changed and amplified to meet the ever-increasing demands of the military situation that had developed. Finally, by the end of 1941, let us say, the war situation had completely changed. What was the position in Europe? One country alone in all Europe, Great Britain stood absolutely steadfast to fight the enemy. The plans had to be changed again. In addition to that, there were hundreds of German U-boats all over the Atlantic, from the northern tip of Norway down to the Argentine, sinking large numbers of ships week after week and month after month. Thousands of ships were sunk. Honourable members know that we could not carry on war without ships. I am merely stating this because military authorities had to be constantly changing their plans as to the number of men there should be in the infantry in order to continue the war successfully.

And eventually what was the picture? Canada had very definitely committed herself to provide a certain number of infantrymen. There can be no doubt about that. Indeed, she had pledged herself to provide a certain number, and further, to maintain them in the field. There was, of course, no pledge in writing, no formal contract or agreement, but nevertheless Canada was pledged. France, Great Britain and other Allied nations also had made undertakings to provide and maintain infantry forces. Also, Canada and every

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other country was bound by what was virtually another pledge, this time to the men in the forces. We have a unit of a thousand men fighting in the field: there are a hundred casualties to-day, two hundred to-morrow, and three hundred the next day. Are we going to do nothing about it? In honour are we not pledged to these men who are doing the fighting? I think we are. I am saying this because the honourable gentleman from Lincoln (Hon. Mr. Bench), if I am not mistaken, suggests that we have gone too far in this war, that we should have been more careful, that we should not have permitted so many men to enlist in the air force and in the navy, and that we should not have built so many ships. I very much doubt the wisdom of that argument.

Hon. Mr. BENCH: Will my honourable friend permit me to interrupt for a moment? I am afraid he took an entirely wrong impression from my remarks. I did not suggest that we permitted too many men to enter the armed services, or that we should not have built so many ships, or that we should not have undertaken the industrial and agricultural commitments which we did undertake. Rather, I suggested that although we should go to the limit, we may have over-expanded or overreached our normal limitations. That was all I suggested. I quite agreed that we should do everything possible, but I did suggest that perhaps we tried to do more than we are able to do.

Hon. Mr. CALDER: Well, I accept the statement, and I apologize sincerely to the honourable gentleman if I have taken a wrong impression from what he said. But what he says now has exactly the same implication. What he says, in effect, is that in view of existing conditions in Canada—I presume that relates to the question of population—there is just a possibility that under the arrangement we made too many men were taken into the forces.

Hon. Mr. BENCH: Does my honourable friend not admit that there might be a limitation to what we can do? There must be some limitation.

Hon. Mr. CALDER: The answer to that will be found on yesterday's record. We should ask ourselves what the people of Great Britain did, and what they are doing now. There is no comparison at all between what we are doing and what they have done, and are still doing to-day. At any rate, the Government alone had the duty of deciding what the size of our forces should be, and the Government did decide. The decision was not made by members of this House or of the other House. Did any member ever