

“The sequence of events leading to a Kennedy Round agreement in May 1967 took on all the aspects of a foreign policy crisis, requiring Presidential decisions in Washington and round-the-clock meetings in Geneva. In order to manage last-minute Kennedy Round strategy, the President...in April 1967 ordered a small and secret command group at the White House, consisting of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of Agriculture John Schnittker, Acting Secretary of Commerce Alexander Trowbridge, and [Deputy Special Assistant, Francis M.] Bator, to communicate directly in Geneva with [Special Representative for Trade Negotiations] William M. Roth.”<sup>24</sup>

Third, the Johnson Administration took steps to “sell” the final outcome of the negotiations to interested segments of the American public. As the archival material suggests: “It was presumably with the need for public support in mind that in March 1964, President Johnson appointed 37 prominent citizens to a Public Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations, ...and he considered advice from industry and labour leaders on such issues as anti-dumping.”<sup>25</sup>

These developments foreshadow the complexities that now characterize the conduct of trade policy, such as the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the complex interplay of domestic policy interests with international obligations and objectives. In this context, the Kennedy Round may be said to have ushered in the modern era of trade liberalization. Alternatively, if one thinks of the early postwar period as “modern,” then the Kennedy Round ushered in the post-modern era.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Foreign Relations Series Volume Summary, 1964-1968, op cit.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> See William A. Dymond and Michael M. Hart, “Post-Modern Trade Policy: Reflections on the Challenges to Multilateral Trade Negotiations after Seattle,” *Journal of World Trade* 34 (3): 21-38, 2000. Dymond and