

of possible future developments should not deter us from a course of action which offers promise of substantial benefits in the immediate future. If the result of such a re-assessment were a tacit understanding by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to refrain from the development of ABM systems – and so prevent a new dimension of escalation of the arms race – the dividends in terms of reduced tension and enhanced international stability would place us all in a much better position to examine the vital political issues which still divide us and which so largely determine our prospects for reducing armaments.

#### PERILS OF PROLIFERATION

We accept the inevitability of change in international relations and institutions. The world does not stand still, so any balance of power which now exists is not permanently assured. The elements of the nuclear equation do not remain constant. New factors emerge and old ones change. The major powers are continually refining and improving their nuclear weapons. Within the present decade, two additional nations have emerged as nuclear powers. Other potential candidates are now weighing the advantages of joining the nuclear club. Moreover, the number of states capable of developing their own nuclear weapons is constantly increasing. We face – not as an academic problem but in a very real and urgent form – the dangers of proliferation. These dangers are upon us. The further spread of nuclear weapons will increase the risk of nuclear war and so the insecurity of all nations. It could add a new and threatening factor to historical, ethnic and territorial disputes existing between nations. A decision by one country to acquire nuclear weapons would almost certainly generate strong pressure on others to take similar action. International relations would thereby be made more complicated and more dangerous. Agreements on arms-control measures would become more difficult to achieve and any prospect of progress in this field would recede. Moreover, there would be greater risk of nuclear war breaking out as a result of human error flowing from defective control arrangements or through the action of irresponsible elements into whose hands the weapons might fall.

Further nuclear proliferation is most likely to occur in countries faced with a conventional or nuclear threat but lacking the protection and security afforded by membership in a nuclear alliance. In such circumstances, certain non-aligned countries might be persuaded to create a nuclear arsenal in the vain hope of improving their national security, or in anticipation of a similar development by a hostile neighbour, or in order to enhance their national prestige and their international influence.

#### URGENCY OF PREVENTION

The prevention of such nuclear proliferation is important and urgent. In his annual report for 1965, the UN Secretary-General describes it as “the most urgent question of the present time which should remain at the very top of the disarmament agenda”. President Johnson has made clear the central place in his administration’s policy of the effort to control, to reduce and ultimately to eliminate modern

engines of nuclear destruction, to act now to prevent nuclear spread, to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce nuclear stocks.

In his message to the ENDC of last February 1, Chairman Kosygin said: “If we do not put an end to the proliferation in the world of nuclear weapons, the threat of the unleashing of nuclear war will be increased many times.” Unfortunately, not all the potential nuclear powers have taken such an unequivocal stand.

The issues involved in this matter are so complex that no single measure is likely to provide a solution. Where considerations of national security and international prestige are closely intertwined, answers must be sought in several directions if we are to succeed in preventing nuclear proliferation. Measures proposed will need to take into account the factors motivating countries to seek nuclear weapons and to make provision for appropriate disincentives. Obviously, too, we must concentrate on those countries capable of achieving nuclear status – not in the more remote future but over the next decade.

#### CONTROLLED SHARING

The discussions at present going on...at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for an international treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons make little progress, despite the urgency of the matter. But the time used for argument on general principles will have been wasted unless it results in an instrument linking both the nuclear and non-nuclear countries. These discussions have revealed the existence of two different types of problem. The first is the question of multilateral nuclear-sharing. This has its origin in the desire of the non-nuclear members of NATO for a voice in the planning and management of the nuclear forces on which they feel their own security so largely depends. The discussion here has made plain the importance of a clear and precise definition of proliferation.

On this issue, we in Canada stand on the principles embodied in the Irish resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority at the General Assembly in 1961. We are convinced that proliferation would not occur under the terms of a treaty which required that the present nuclear powers must retain full control of their nuclear weapons. Perhaps such a treaty should prohibit, specifically, the transfer of such control to states, groups of states or other entities, requiring that the present nuclear states must at all times maintain the power of veto over deployment and firing of such nuclear weapons.

#### PROBLEM OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The nuclear-sharing issue is, of course, closely connected with a second and broader question, that of European security, which, in its turn, is concerned with the settlement of important political questions on that continent.

While much of the present lack of progress in efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation derives from difficulties about nuclear-sharing and European security, it seems to me that, in the long run, these questions may prove less intractable than the other problem of the national development of nuclear