

The Bosnia CSBM Agreement is unique in that it is the first agreement of this type to be initiated in the presence of a huge multinational peace enforcement operation. Already some problem areas have been identified related to language of the text, verification of its provisions, and effective implementation, including compliance with the provisions. For example, while the CSBM Agreement covers certain types of weapons systems, such as anti-aircraft guns of specified caliber, there is no requirement to report or inspect them. It is also difficult to determine whether or not inspected units are in compliance with the Article II Agreement because of the difficulty in matching exchanged data with equipment on the ground; in some cases, this is because there was no provision to exchange data after heavy weapons had been moved into cantonments and barracks.

The OSCE is responsible for implementation of the extensive verification provisions of the agreement, but it has little leverage with which to ensure compliance. Signatory parties had insufficient time to prepare themselves for implementation or to train arms control inspectors prior to the beginning of the inspection schedules. Because the OSCE had no infrastructure to organize missions in the field, everything associated with the inspections has been done on an ad hoc basis.

On 30 January 1996, in compliance with Article IV of Annex I-B, the relevant parties (those listed above plus Croatia and Serbia) exchanged information on five categories of military equipment--battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery pieces of a specified caliber, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. Article IV, which is modeled upon the CFE Treaty, calls for a four-month baseline validation period (1 July-1 November 1996), a sixteen-month reduction period (1 July 1996-1 November 1997), and subsequently a ceiling for military personnel and equipment holdings in the five categories listed above. According to some observers, the information provided by four of the five parties was acceptable, that is, within the expectations of Western intelligence. Information provided by the fifth party, Serbia, was unacceptable. Given that an effective agreement along the model of the CFE requires a high degree of transparency, it can only be hoped that Serbia will be encouraged to comply by Russia and other interested countries.

The Bosnia and Somalia operations raised questions in the United States centered around the evaluative criterion of national security interests. In a provocative article, Edward Luttwak has argued that while the criterion of "vital" interests is often cited during arguments for and against U.S. participation in U.N. peace operations, it is not the decisive consideration; rather projected casualties dominates U.S. policy decision-making. He believes that senior military officers were willing to send troops to Somalia in late 1992 because they believed that no casualties would ensue from a humanitarian mission, while, at the same time, they successfully resisted the use of force in the former Yugoslavia, citing lack of vital interests as the reason when in fact they feared there would be fighting and casualties. "As always, talk of U.S. interests, present or absent, vital or not, was merely part of the rhetorical carapace of policy decisions