

Second, it attempts (again in a non-formal way) to assess whether or not there have been any potential or actual trade-offs between greater military spending and lower economic growth, between greater military spending and lower levels of health and education spending, and between a greater military presence in society and lower levels of political and civil freedoms. The comparative indices used are: average levels of economic growth over the past decade, combined public spending on health and education, and a "freedom index" that assesses comparative levels of civil and political freedoms.

Although these case studies do not discuss in detail any of the possible mechanisms for reducing the military burden on states and regions, the report has made four general findings and drawn four policy-relevant conclusions. More specific issues are also discussed in each of the case studies.

Findings

- i) one or two states seldom stand out in a region as being of concern on all possible measures of their military burden, although often a state (or states) scores high on two or more indices. Hence it is possible in most of the regions examined here to identify states of concern (a comprehensive list is included in the last chapter).
- ii) it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to find clear evidence that links the military burden of a state or group of states with specific negative consequences, such as lower economic growth, low levels of social welfare spending, or high levels of repression. In some cases, however, good arguments can be offered for the negative consequences of security spending, taking into account the circumstances and history of particular states.⁴
- iii) related to this, efforts to find an "objective" index of excessive spending have limited utility, and to some extent miss the point. Security, and the means by which it should be achieved, includes an irreducible subjective element, which is best assessed in a cooperative security dialogue (this, at least, is one clear lesson of the East-West confidence and security-building experience that can be fruitfully exported). Hence purely quantitative indicators are useful only as a catalyst to such a dialogue.

⁴ The small number of states in each region studied prohibit statistically robust tests from being performed. It is possible that a more general statistical analysis (large sample) could uncover such relationships, although no previous studies have done so. It is also possible that a more focused analysis (that took, for example, those states identified as *prima facie* carrying an excessive military burden as its sample comparison group) could uncover such relationships. Further work in both areas should be undertaken.