

a more cost-effective and timely United Nations response. The following are examples of existing United Nations organizations with resources and expertise upon which CITA would draw.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA has operated what is essentially the world's first OSI system for more than a quarter century. The safeguards system, which uses OSI as a primary monitoring resource, forms an important part of a regime that has been established to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and to build confidence that nuclear installations are used only for peaceful purposes.

The most fundamental requirement for successful inspection is information. Inspectors must know where to go and what to inspect. It is not possible for inspectors to visit and examine every building and basement in a foreign country, nor is the provision for random visits sufficient. Inspectors must have access to information leading them to sites and installations of possible interest.

Verification is an essential ingredient of modern-day arms control agreements. It may serve either as a deterrent or as a means of assuring compliance or both. In the nuclear arena where the same technologies, materials and facilities can serve peaceful or military ends, verification of peaceful use is particularly important and the NPT provides for verification by the IAEA of compliance with the undertaking not to divert nuclear materials.

A principal result of the independent verification by the IAEA safeguards inspectorate is the provision of assurance that no diversion of the nuclear materials declared by a state has taken place. A problem in this context is that the safeguards inspectorate has focussed only on declared facilities and activities, ignoring the possibility of undeclared sites. IAEA verification is also intended to have the effect of deterring diversions by the risk of early detection. The assurance obtained from the IAEA as an effective and objective auditor increases confidence among states and helps to allay concerns which could provide the political motivation for the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The size of the IAEA's safeguards inspectorate has been described earlier. Within its structure is a sensitive and confidential technical information data base, which supports the overall verification process. The IAEA undertakes, within its own resources and with the support of Member States, an indoctrination program which provides specialized OSI training *ab initio* for newly arrived inspectors.

The United Nations Special Commission

The circumstances under which UNSCOM was established by the Security Council are unique and are unlikely to be repeated. UNSCOM, as a specialized organ of the Security Council, has been in constant evolution. Its tasks and operating procedures and experience could be instrumental in forming the core of CITA. The important aspect of the UNSCOM experience from CITA's perspective rests at this time on the monitoring process which was developed under a series of UN Security Council resolutions and whose embodiment today is seen in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre, which operates with the active support of the Government of Iraq. An ancillary benefit in terms of UN operations accrues from the close collaboration between two UN organizations (i.e., UNSCOM and the IAEA) and the resultant synergistic co-operation through a sharing of resources and of expertise to achieve the objectives identified by the Security Council.

UNSCOM, along with the Director-General of the IAEA, was charged with the responsibility for implementing plans adopted by the Security Council for on-going monitoring and verification (OMV) activities in Iraq. The purpose of these activities is to prevent Iraq from either importing or developing the capability to manufacture components, or entire units, of prohibited weapon systems — nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, or long-range ballistic missiles. OMV for nuclear weapons is primarily the responsibility of the IAEA, while OMV for other weapons systems is primarily the responsibility of UNSCOM. Where dual-use equipment involves both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons systems, the organizations share responsibility.

