

bombers were traded for ICBMs (generally valued as the most responsive, penetrating, counter-force element of strategic forces), the traditional American commitment to the manned bomber would be jeopardised. The question arises, therefore, as to the bomber ceiling below which American planners would consider that the triad had been lost.

To summarise, the net effect of the proposed reductions is the following: the Soviets would obviously choose to maintain a 60% sub-ceiling for their ICBMs. This drives them to a choice between SLBMs and bombers in their remaining forces, with the circumstantial evidence suggesting rather strongly that they would choose to maintain their bomber force at a low level, leaving it as a residual hedge against uncertainty. On the other side, the reduction may exacerbate the perceived American problem with the vulnerability of their ICBM forces, but it nonetheless allows them to draw down in a manner which would permit the maintenance of the triad. These issues, are further explored in the next section on modernization.

D. Soviet Force Reductions After Certain Specified Modernization

Table 6

USSR With Modernization	
<u>Launcher ceiling 1273</u>	<u>Launcher ceiling 6000</u> (Subceiling 3600)
150 SS-18 (10 warheads)	1500
100 SS-19 (6 warheads)	600
100 SS-X-24 (10 warheads)	1000
500 SS-25 (1 warhead)	500
	(3600)
100 SS-N-18 (7 warheads)	700
80 SS-N-20 (9 warheads)	720
83 SS-NX-23 (7 warheads)	581
	(2001)
100 Bombers (4)	400
<u>1213</u>	<u>6001</u>