9. General considerations

- (a) Varification should be seen in light of and as a function of the scope of a convention
- (b) National means of verification and international verification should complement each other
- (c) National means alone would not be credible, and not all States have means to verify beyond their borders
- (d) All States parties to the convention should be enabled to participate and benefit from verification procedures
- (e) Relationship between level of protection against CW attacks, level of sophistication of CW attacks and probability of detection (or verification)

III - OTHER MATTERS */

1. Security assurances for Parties to the convention

- (a) Negative guarantee or non-use declarations
- (b) Positive guarantees
 - (i) medical assistance to State victim of CW attack

(ii) co-operation of parties in development of protective measures and equipment

(iii) international advisory body could be established under the convention to help developing countries

- (iv) economic co-operation on peaceful uses of toxic substances - assistance in acquiring know-how would further confidence
- (v) political and military assistance

2. Right of withdrawal from the convention

(a) Specify conditions for withdrawal

^{*/} Issues such as review conferences, entry into force, amendment procedures, etc. were not raised at the meetings of the Working Group."