

In its first invitation following the conclusion of the Final Act, NATO invited all CSCE participants to an October 1975 exercise. In September 1976 it voluntarily notified and invited some Warsaw Pact members to a smaller exercise. The Warsaw Pact did not accept either of these invitations.

The Warsaw Pact invited observers to its first exercise following the Accords in February 1976. However, in contrast, it invited a limited number of participants, including only Greece and Turkey from NATO. The United States was not invited to a Warsaw Pact exercise until February 1978, at the same time as the Belgrade Review Meeting. The United States declined the second invitation to a manoeuvre, held in July 1979, and was not invited again until September 1986. In September 1983 the Warsaw Pact notified the first and only smaller exercise to which it invited observers.

The Warsaw Pact consistently notified its major exercises twenty-one days in advance, following the agreed guidelines. Smaller manoeuvres were notified with shorter warning times, ranging from the same day to twenty-one days in advance. NATO warning time for major exercises was twenty-one days or more. For smaller exercises, notification was four days or more.

NATO repeatedly criticized the Warsaw Pact for failing to provide more than a minimal amount of information — such as location, type, purpose of exercise — in its notifications. United States documents claim that, while hosting observers at manoeuvres, NATO and the NNA allowed much greater access and more flexible conditions than did the Warsaw Pact. Western observers often found themselves viewing staged drills. They had little liberty of movement or freedom to use cameras and binoculars.

The only significant breaches of the Final Act occurred in 1981. In March, the Warsaw Pact carried out an exercise in Poland, *Soyuz 81*, which was not notified. Western reports suggested that the exercise may have involved more than 25,000 troops, and therefore should have been notified. But there were some ambiguities; the incident was not pursued. In September, participants were given improper notification of an exercise, *ZAPAD 81*, which took place in the Soviet Union near the Polish border. No name for the manoeuvre was given, and neither the type of forces involved nor the size of the exercise was mentioned, counter to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. The United States made a formal protest of the incomplete notification.

There were other minor irritations, but, in general, compliance with the letter of the Accords was relatively good. Even under the limited measures in place, confidence increased. The procedures created some transparency among the military forces involved, and some predictability in the way those forces were deployed and exercised.

For more substantial confidence to be created and nurtured, however, the participants had to accept and develop the spirit of the Final Act in a broad sense. Neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO was very successful in this regard.

The Soviet Union did not seem to be interested in pursuing the spirit of Helsinki: it failed to notify smaller manoeuvres, provided minimal information, and invited observers only infrequently. On a more general level, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Polish situation in the 1980s, and the Soviet Union's intransigence on human rights and arms control issues during that period, further undermined the confidence and cooperation that was supposed to develop from the Final Act.

At first, the United States, and the other NATO allies, exhibited more willingness to encourage the spirit of Helsinki by notifying smaller exercises, freely disseminating information, and treating observers attentively. Although this approach of strict compliance continued throughout the period during which the Accords were in effect, by the end of the 1970s the West had become disillusioned with détente and angered by the seeming opportunism of the Soviets. The American reaction in the late 1970s, and even more so in the early 1980s, was to assume a hard line against the Soviet Union by reducing bilateral and multilateral contacts, pursuing a significant military build-up, and becoming more willing to use military rather than diplomatic means to deal with international crises. The West's superior record of compliance was used as a means of impugning that of the Soviets. The Helsinki process was relegated to the background of foreign policy objectives.

East-West relations during this period deteriorated to an extent not witnessed since the height of the Cold War. Whatever confidence had been built up through the adherence to the letter of the agreement withered away because of the inability of either side to pursue and enhance the spirit of the Accords.

#### *Compliance with the Stockholm Confidence-Building Measures*

The Stockholm Agreement has been in effect for more than three years, and it is now possible to begin to assess the compliance of participants. Though some problems have been reported, the signatories have adhered to the letter of the Agreement to a remarkably high degree. As mentioned previously, the language of the Stockholm Agreement is better defined, its rules more strictly enforceable, than those of the Helsinki Accords.

Table II shows that 115 exercises were forecast in the first three calendars issued by all CSCE participants, covering the period from 1987 to 1989. In addition, nine advance forecasts (exercises involving over 40,000 troops)