

any arms control agreement, of course. Betts goes on to note, however, in the context of a proposed trade-off between European-based Pershing IIs and forward-deployed Soviet SLBMs, that “the potential escalatory effects of violation might be modified (or deterred) by declaring in advance that any violation would trigger reciprocal reintroduction of the comparable system.”¹⁵⁸ The same would be true of an agreement limited to submarines, although it is unclear how the “escalatory effects” would thereby be mitigated; rather, it would seem, hope would have to repose in the deterrence effect. Betts suggests as another possible remedy the “option . . . to declare that detection of a submarine within the forbidden range would prompt immediate launch of airborne communication links (which would mitigate the paralyzing effect of a decapitating attack on leadership in Washington, since subordinate commanders would have more chance of coordinating retaliation) . . . if it has been declared in peacetime to be an automatic response it is less likely to elicit a preemptive response than if it is undertaken without prior explanation.”¹⁵⁹

Finally, Vick and Thomson cite “an important geopolitical asymmetry” between the Superpowers as a major obstacle to the creation of such a stand-off zone. In their words, “the Soviet Union could agree to a keep-out zone without seriously undermining its relationship with key allies,” while “a U.S. agreement to respect a 2,000 to 3,000-kilometer zone around the Soviet Union would necessitate removal from European waters of SSBNs dedicated to NATO.”¹⁶⁰ It is unclear, however, why the SSBNs in question could not remain committed to NATO and be capable of taking part in a European land battle, while still being stationed outside a zone of the dimensions necessary to safeguard the Soviet NCA and bomber bases (or, with the introduction of hard-target-kill-capable D-5 SLBMs by the US, Soviet fixed ICBM sites as well) from short-warning attack.

158. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

159. *Ibid.*

160. Vick and Thomson, *op. cit.* note 135, p. 122.