

strongly reinforced by increasing recognition of the difficulties associated with mid-course detection, tracking and interception).

So far, the issues raised do not constitute a compelling case for concluding that any specific programme would necessarily involve the use of Canadian territory. However, more speculative technologies, such as Braduskill, may require Northern deployment, in which case Canadian basing may be a prerequisite for an effective system.¹⁹ Although there is considerable uncertainty, therefore, the combination of polar routes and 'layered' defence systems does in fact lead to the presumption that Canadian territory will become the strategic foreground for ABM defence, and that, sooner or later, Canadian participation would be required. This raises the prospect that if Canada were determined to abstain from involvement in ABM defences, the Government might declare specifically that it would not lend Canadian territory to ABM deployments. Leaving aside the obvious political issues arising from such a declaration, this might well influence the US research programme since such a declaration would adversely affect the prospects of those systems which were likely to benefit the most from Canadian deployment. It is nevertheless a complex and awkward option, since the Government could find itself refusing to co-operate in the deployment of ABM defences while actively supporting a concomitant increase in defence against bombers and cruise missiles which was itself the consequence of ABM deployments.

In any event, greater activity in the air defence field will not necessarily await a positive decision concerning SDI. As was noted earlier, such activity has proceeded independently of the SDI programme. It may, however, be implicitly linked to a pro-SDI strategy for the following reasons:

- (i) a desire to spread defensive system expenditures over as long a period as possible, and thus to begin with the known technologies of air defence;
- (ii) a desire to counter criticism of SDI by demonstrating that defensive systems are feasible, and that there is a defence against the cruise missile, and
- (iii) a desire to develop surveillance systems for air-breathing systems which may have eventual utility for detection and threat assessment in a BMD role. Both space-based radar and satellite infra-red imaging experiments such as Teal Ruby might be examples of this interdependence between SDI and air defence.

¹⁹ Braduskill is "a next-generation exo-atmospheric interceptor that is intended to meet the growing Soviet threat of decoys by being able to distinguish between a decoy and an actual warhead". It is not immediately apparent why Braduskill, if developed, would require deployment in Canada rather than Alaska. However, Braduskill programme analysts are reported to have said that Canadian deployment is essential. Braduskill would be fired from the far north toward the United States, flying alongside incoming re-entry vehicles for 10 to 15 minutes while it discriminated between decoys and warheads. *Inside the Pentagon*, 14 March 1986, 4 April 1986.